A Dialogue with Professor Berque[*]
– from the standpoint of ethics (including environmental ethics)

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My given task is to attempt a dialogue with Professor Berque's mesology (mésologie) from the standpoint of ethics (including environmental ethics). In order to clarify issues, I will at first make a sketch of mesology, then focus on problematic of contemporary ethics, and at last discuss how mesology is located in the problematic and what questions and criticism can be posed to mesology.

 I is the manuscript for the symposium on October 30. 2004. II is added on and after the symposium.

I
1. A sketch of mesology

   Professor Berque's mesology is an ontological analysis of human existence. If man abstracts it from its reference to Plato, Aristotle, and Nishida, man can locate it in the vein of phenomenology. Whereas human beings are under the condition of milieu, they express themselves in milieu. This point is a mesological explication of Heidegger's concept of thrown projection (geworfener Entwurf). By the way, Heidegger expressed the cooperative being of humans with the term "Being-with (Mitsein)" in his *Being and Time (Sein und Zeit)*. But it has not amount to a full and positive explication of this feature. It was the reason that his argument depended upon the concept of Being-towards-death (Sein zum Tode), which no one can exchange with any other one. In the beginning of *Milieu (Fudo)*, Watsuji set out to explain the concept of milieu, describing how human beings resist to natural violence and labor positively on nature at once. His conclusion is that milieu is no other than the cooperative being of humans. Thus he criticized Heidegger's analysis appealing only to temporality as one-sided (1). Professor Berque undertakes this conception of Watsuji. But he also points out that Watsuji confused his personal experience with one of inhabitants in the milieu (2). It would be possible for Professor Berque as geographer to bring a much fitter analysis of milieu from the viewpoint of inhabitants. As he repeats, man cannot create milieu from

nothing. Husserl's concept of horizon and Heidegger's concept of thrownness (Geworfenheit) led to this awareness of human finitude. However, it is significant in this context that Professor Berque absorbed Merleau-Ponty's philosophy into his mesology: Merleau-Ponty described living body as homogeneous to nature. This appropriation enabled to exclude an interpretation that all senses of milieu derive from subject (3). Such a misinterpretation could occur, if man appealed only to the concept of existence. Thus Berque's mesology has learned to give a coherent explanation of the process of humanization from animal belonging to nature or ecosystem to human being with technique and symbol: homo sapiens appeared, acquired the capacity to change things artificially, and became finally human. In this context, milieu is reinterpreted as medial body (corps médial) (4). The concept of milieu essentially rejects the dichotomy between nature and culture. However the theory of milieu tends to be taken for a cultural interpretation of nature or for classification of special milieus. Setting the concept of living body on the ground, Berque's mesology can sweep away such an interpretation, deepen its consideration about the natural basis of human beings and sharpen the knowledge that milieu is essential to the existential structure of them in general.

2. Contemporary problematic of ethics

If ethics is literally taken for a study of ethos, ontological analysis of human being belongs to ethics. But ethics as normative science indicates specific norms to us. Norms and values are given to us not only by ethics. But religion, school education, mass media, or even personal belief could also preach 'an ethic' (5). The distinguishing feature of ethics from the rest consists in its keen reflection on the foundation of norms. Therefore ethics considers why such and such norms are claimed and what procedure they have followed to be adopted. No single ontology or metaphysics is dominant in our contemporary society. Thus one concern of contemporary ethics is how man can mediate different values or conflicting claims for interests and, as its premise, how man can ensure the chances for every claim to speak out. What is the object ethically respected? Who or what has interests? How much should we respect which of conflicting claims because of what right they have? Generally speaking, we can list up the following ideas as especially relevant to the contemporary ethics or, more roughly speaking, the modern ethics since Kant: justice (every being should be treated proper to it), right (the beings of the same entitlement can require equal treatment), and universalizability (which is symbolized by these ideas).

Although there is variety of scope according to different kinds of environmental 'ethic', one of novelty of environmental ethics consists in the enlargement of what should be ethically respected: unborn and becoming generations, sentient animals, plants, and ecosystems including lifeless things (5). But how can justice and right be applied to

them? Very this point tells us the difficulty of foundation of any environmental 'ethic', while it is a metaethical charm of environmental ethics to ask again about the sense of justice and right.

The traditional position, which respects ethically only human beings, is called anthropocentrism. There are two alternatives: while one takes short-run economic interest for human interest (the strong anthropocentrism), the other envisages long-run interest which man can derive from the symbiosis between human beings and nature (the weak anthropocentrism) (6). In the latter case the interests of future generations should be also considered. Now how could man distribute among generations? Some of values would be shared among generations. But it still remains an enigma how man can determine the fair portions among generations: while we associate the concept of distribution or "sharing" with the spatial relation, we must here distribute or share in the temporal relation, where what we should distribute occurs and disappears. When we pay attention to, for example, the use of available fossil fuels or irreversible greenhouse effect, what standard and what calculation could determine the "just" portion for each generation?

"We should protect environment for the sake of the nature or ecosystem. Human beings are only member of it. They have no privilege against other members." I call this party non-anthropocentrism. The proponents of non-anthropocentrism often refer to right of nature. But every right is accompanied with the fair portion that should belong to the right owners. Thus the entitlement of right leads to the problem of distributional justice. Now how could the proponents of non-anthropocentrism determine the just portion between nature and human beings? How could they speak of distributional justice? Man can get harvest from nature through human labor. Then, how much has human labor contributed to the harvest? And how much has nature done? This is the problem that Locke encountered, when he thought about the relation between labor and property. Like Locke, I think, we must be hampered by the incommensurability of value between human beings and nature (7). There is no transcendent place over which man could overlook both domains of human beings as well as nature: therefore man cannot apply the same concept of right to them. If the proponents of non-anthropocentrism argued that human beings could stand on such a place, it would make the status of human beings incoherent, partly obtaining such a transcendent ability and partly being no more than a member of the whole nature (8).

Man can go another way than the foundation on justice. It was the case in Jonas' principle of responsibility. Mankind is most responsible for the occurrence of contemporary ecological crisis. Mankind might be most evil, because it has threatened and will continue to threaten its future generations as well as the rest of nature. Nevertheless mankind has responsibility that it should continue to be. It is the reason that the entities capable to feel themselves responsible must be ethically required

above all. Thus Jonas is attacked by an authentically philosophical question: "Should mankind continue to be?" He does not evade it. Nor does he seek shelter in egoism of human beings. But he finds an affirmative answer in ethical thinking, relying upon the image of human beings as 'the entities that feel themselves responsible'. I think that his logic appeals to performative inconsistency: if man gave a negative answer for the question "should mankind continue to be?" and mankind disappeared, then no entity could longer consider the ethical question "should/ should not" and the question itself would be nonsense. This inconsistency may not be committed so that the affirmative answer must be given (9).

However Jonas is criticized by the proponents of discourse ethics (10). At first their criticism focuses on Jonas' ontology, which undertakes Aristotelian philosophy of nature that is alien to modern thought. But the objection is not only to the contents of this ontology. From the viewpoint of discourse ethics, it is in the light of justice that each claim for values or ontology should be mediated and conflicting interests should be coordinated: Commitment to any specific ontology would not ensure the mediation and coordination. It would be, according to discourse ethics, possible only by discourse, i.e. community of communication. The concept of community of communication derives from the kingdom of purposes i.e. community of persons in the Kantian sense and is sophisticated by the concept of intersubjectivity and a linguistic turn, which belong to the philosophy in the twentieth century. Each specific value and ontology or any interest in certain domains (law, politics, economy, and aesthetics etc.) is no other than one of many opinions which shall be discussed through discourse. This opposition between Jonas and discourse ethics illustrates the dominant situation of contemporary ethics: although we are compelled to reflect radically on being of humans (for example, because of ecological crisis) or on the values in the modern society, we cannot but pick up even such a reflection (as Jonas did) as one of many opinions in the midst of conflicting interests in various domains of law, politics, and economy etc., so long as we live in the modern society, which presupposes multiplicity of values and universalizability.

3. The ethical implications of mesology

So far as Professor Berque's mesology is ontology of human existence, it is partially a study of ethos, i.e. ethics. However, what norms could be derived from it and what procedure could be prescribed to follow by it? Each milieu has its specific norms. A concrete guiding principle is then indicated that "not to lose respect for the others … the respect for the form of things around us should be required."(11) I agree with this affirmation. It is sustained by a phenomenological analysis that shows milieu to be an essential factor of human existence. However, at once, I cannot help asking how this assertion would enable us to open the place to hold discourse with conflicting opinions

and how it could help to negotiate with the proponents of conflicting claims about different interests (for example, economic interests by globalization).

It reminds me of another affirmation, which also is supported by a phenomenological analysis. Held derives an ethical connotation from Husserl's concepts of home-world and world of strangers: "It [= a political cosequence] requires that all home-worlds be departed from the interest that consists in the desire of cultural investment in one way or another by other territories [Elle [= une consequence politique] requiert que tous les mondes natals se départissent de cet intérêt qui consiste à vouloir, d'une manière ou d'une autre, "investir" culturellement d'autres territoires]." (12) When I read it, I had to ask, "why and how much?", although I agreed with this opinion: unless the reason and the extent are not explicitly dealt with, it might be interpreted as a prescription of mere reproduction of the own culture and tradition.

Likewise, what supports the requirement of protection of the own milieu? Suppose use of car. It is said about it that "it is wrong because it opposes milieu (écoumène). It is wrong because it deteriorates biosphere in the long run and has thousands people injured, disabled and killed almost every day over the world."(13). Does it mean that it is wrong either because of destruction of ecosystem or because of murder of human life? No. It would be properly interpreted from the viewpoint of mesology that it is wrong because it destroys the milieu. But this affirmation leads to claim for a special form of life or life style. Under multiplicity of values, is it persuadable enough to reject the conflicting opinions (for example, one referring to economic interests)? Or suppose that it would be mediated with economic interests and use of car would be permitted so long as it would be of a strong public nature. How could then the just portion of the use be calculated? "What is important is not rationing, but reasoning."(14) This claim would be natural from the standpoint of mesology. However, then, the same criticism must be posed to mesology as to Jonas by discourse ethics: could man derive a practical solution for conflict from mesology?

My point is not that mesology would abide by a relativistic claim to preserve our own milieu. Milieu is open. Yes, indeed. If we move our bodies from the home-world to a world of strangers, we might possibly be accustomed to the latter. Translated it into the words of mesology, the moved animal body can start to build medial body again. But if the openness does not only stand up in fact, but also is ethically required, what is the reason? Watsuji said, "We must love our milieu, realizing the meaning of our destiny that we are born in our milieu. … We would be able to contribute to the culture of mankind in terms of the specialty which other people could not obtain, if we sublate [=*aufheben* in Hegel's sense] and take advantage of it." (15) Watsuji's logic suggests the ideal of mankind that is brought only through the process which every people with its own milieu sublates their specialties each other. Has Professor Berque such an idea of mankind too? If it is the case, through what process of sublation is the ideal of

mankind built up?

We could maybe find a clue to it in the concept of city (cité, civitas). "A city should be there under the law for all people."(16) This place "must be characterized as chôra, which is soaked into the widest being of humanity."(17) If man could seek in mesology the place, where everyone is respected as human being without connection with any attribute (i.e. an equivalence of the kingdom of purposes or community of persons in the Kantian sense or the community of communication in discourse ethics), the concept of city would correspond to it or would be at least an approach to it.

But we must pay attention to the fact that a city is supported by "the quality of members belonging to the same city" or "reciprocity of common bond."(18) What creates and shapes this membership or common bond? What fosters the chôra correspondent to humanity? Kant and discourse ethics could appeal to mere spiritual ideas such as person or humanity. However it would be too abstract in mesology. How could mesology explain the condition and the process, through which such a chôra might be constructed?

Let us ask a concrete question. In some cities in US different races live in different partitions. "It is no other than an instinctive rejection of membership on the naturalistic (especially racial) base."(19) Then what should sustain this membership? Is it the identity of American society as multiethnic nation? Is it the Constitution of the United States after all? From the viewpoint of mesology these reasons appear to be too abstract, even if constitutions as cultural products belong to medial body. Now suppose man refers to the idea of the form of city. By what criterion would we distinguish good forms from bad ones? My point is not that the situation in some of the city in US is justified. Ethically it might not be justified. It opposes to justice: the inhabitants in the crowded partitions suffer from more traffic accidents or more miserable environmental factors such as air pollution, which are not only due to them. But if man appeals to justice, it requires not only reasoning, but also rationing as to how much should be imposed to whom.

Is not it possible for various conflicting claims or interests to happen even in the same city or chôra? Suppose that the plan of the architect, who is introduced as "an example of topos in sheer ignorance of chôra" (20), is accepted by some inhabitants, but rejected by other inhabitants. What guidance would mesology give them? "The form of city is the medial body of partners. People who become partners speak to us in the common language."(21) Then the architect is not a partner. But how about the inhabitants willing to adopt his plan? Could city mediate these conflicting opinions? Or would it carry out the function to exclude specific claims?

An appropriate size will be necessary for a city to keep its form and order. "A system, which maintains population under the sustainable and human condition, is good."(22) Now who with what entitlement would plan, restore, maintain and control "a good

system"?

The proponents of discourse ethics will reply to these questions, saying "through discourse." If mesology accepts this answer, it would approve that it is no other than "one of many kinds of ontology".

However mesology seems to conceive a different intention. As explained in 1, mesology belongs to the vein of phenomenology. But *Ecoumène: Introduction à l'étude des milieux humains* is written with the intention that "I would like to show this objective actuality of explication of existence beyond phenomenology."(23) Here it is declared that mesology can be in relation to natural sciences and social sciences. In fact, we read the report that shows the possibility of coexistence between consumers and farmers (therefore also rural paysage): we can find in it a social scientific achievement, which is supported not only by reasoning but also by rationing. (24) But the connection of mesology with social sciences appears to remain a possibility that has not yet fully explicated. As described in 2, the dominant trend of contemporary ethics adopts multiplicity of values and universalizability as criterions in evaluating ethical theories. I have attempted to consider the ethical implications of mesology on these criterions. The focus, then, is on the idea of city and "we" that forms the city. About "we" it is said as follows.

-- Who is the "we"?

-- I shall reply to this question, saying "only in your conscience."(26)

Is not this foundation, however, too personal and existential without relevance to intersubjectivity?

II.

1. A supplement to the manuscript

I would like to add a very short comment to make sure the issues.

I believe that Professor Larrimore's critique for Watsuji at p. 100 (the summary) would be also true for mesology. Transforming Professor Larrimore's words, man could say, "Mesology is presented as a form of communitarianism. But there is much else to mesology." What does the "much" mean? Thus the concept of 'city' would be focused on. For the concept of 'city' could possibly break the communitarian relativism. Could the concept of 'city' itself, however, be communitarian? It is the problem that I focus on.

Mesology as ethics cannot but go along a narrow path. On the one side there is liberalism. As Professor Feenberg pointed out at p. 73 (the summary), "a democratic transformation from below" is necessary to overcome the contemporary situation. Liberalism is essential to democracy. But at once liberalism would lead to mere allowance of new technology, for example, "a liberal eugenics", which Habermas criticizes. On the other side there is communitarianism. It could possibly become mere regionalism, at worst ethnocentrism. Mesology as ethics must integrate the openness

of liberalism and the tradition which communitarianism claims. I think that 'city' would be the place for this integration.

2. Comments for further discussion

  Professor Berque answered that he agreed basically with the ideas of Shinagawa about 'city'.

  However he gave the following refutes or explanations.

(i) Shinagawa's last critique about the meaning of "consciousness" is due to misinterpretation by translation. The original expression in French is "for intérieur". The origin of the word "for" was "agora" in Greek and "forum" in Latin. Thus "for intérieur" means "agora inside". No Japanese expression corresponds to it so that man cannot but translating it into the Japanese word "Ryoushin". But the meaning of "Ryoushin (conscience)" is different from one of "for intérieur". Berque asserts here that there are various opinions inside city and various comments from outside so that conflicts occur among them. However one decides oneself ultimately. This is a basic principle of democracy. Therefore he acknowledges intersubjectivity.

(ii) One of Shinagawa's questions refers to an architect, who is introduced as "an example of topos in sheer ignorance of chôra". The plan of this architect is accepted by some inhabitants, but rejected by other inhabitants. What guidance would mesology give them? Professor Berque's answer is that mesology has to abide by the more universal criteria. The more universal criteria lie in nature. Then the architecture against law of nature is not good. There are many problems, but we have to consider the base of nature at first. Secondly mesology finds it desirable that the architecture is not against the history of society of the place.

(iii) How is a chôra constructed? Berque thinks that it is constructed by the social history which we learn from social sciences. In social history there are various stages or milieus. For example, the existence of nation, culture or life style is historical. So the base of mesology is above all history.

(iv) How does man sublate specialties or singularities of various milieus? Berque's basic idea is that it requires some universal frame of reference, criteria, or base. Indeed the universal itself is the absolute being so that we cannot grasp it as a whole, but there are many ways to grasp or predicate what is universal. The way of natural sciences is more universal. When we explain in terms of the relation between S (subject) and P (predicate), S is relatively close to nature, universality, and necessity. On the contrary, P is relatively close to specialty, singularity, and contingency. Culture, which is on the side of P, is indeed a universal condition for human beings, but under it there is the more common base, namely nature, which is common to our species, i.e. mankind. Thus the relations between S and P construct a kind of hierarchy. However S cannot be considered without P in the world of humans. So long as humans exist, P is

also a universal condition. Therefore we must respect every culture. This is a much complicated argument. But when we have to make choice between alternatives, we must prefer the one which is on the side of S to the one which is on the side of P. Thus murder is most evil, because it denies life. Similarly the practice of cutting women's clitoris in some parts of the world is universally not good, even if it is a cultural custom. The reason is that it does harms to animal bodies of humans.

  Professor Feenberg gave me a critical comment. Although Shinagawa evaluates Berque's theory in the light of multiplicity of values and universalizability, the multiplicity of values is not a criterion, but a fact. Nor is universalizability a criterion, but a mere procedural rule which requires that man should recognize the opponents as right holders. The poverty of Habarmas lies in his identification of procedure with criteria. More concrete thought such as Berque's can make a larger contribution toward contemporary concrete issues. We could not deal with them without ontology. We should address to ontology, although it is the object to be discussed.

  My answer for this comment is thus. My starting point is the understanding that we live in the poor times: it is because we acknowledge the multiplicity of values and cannot maintain special values or a single ontology that the procedural ethical thinking such as Habermas is dominant. I evaluate mesology because of its challenges to this contemporary situation. But thorough the prism of the contemporary situation mesology appears to be a kind of communitarianism. This is my point. However I agree with Professor Feenberg, when he said that the interpretation of mesology as communitarianism would prevent us from appreciating correctly the relation of it to nature. Naturally I would not like to give too a narrow interpretation. The issue could be formulated as follows: it is universal that human beings live in milieu and have relation to nature. It is a merit of Berque's mesology to point it out. But if mesology claims the significance of a special milieu in a concrete situation, would it tend to be involved with communitarianism? It is the reason that I emphasize the role of open place for discussion in the idea of 'city'.

  I am very much obliged for Professor Berque's answers, which make my understanding of mesology go further. At last I add the issue that we could not deal with because of a shortage of time in the symposium.

  In the base of mesology, as the answers (ii) and (iii) prove, we find deep confidence in the nature common to human beings as species and social history as well as natural and social sciences, which could give us objective knowledge about them. The strength of this confidence was beyond my expectation. We have often experienced that so-called scientific knowledge were proved to be soaked by ideology. Could we be so confident of objectivity of sciences? Indeed only science can prove the influence of ideology. So I do

not challenge to the confidence itself. My point is rather the following question. Would we be unable to treat evenly opinions of scientists and lay persons, if we are much confident of scientific knowledge? How would the discussion in 'city' be influenced then? In some cases citizens can decide from the larger scope on the base of information from scientists. In other cases a guideline against citizens might be endorsed by scientists. In any case it is a problem how scientists should participate in the discussion in 'city'.

I focus on this problem, because a similar problem is attacked in applied ethics, which deal with concrete issues in our social life: what role should moral philosopher play there? I think that the place where issues occur is a kind of 'commons'. It is not territory of moral philosophers. So they should not play a role as moral experts who give a special answer or guideline for the problem at stake. Instead they should coordinate various opinions of citizens and scientists of many fields. This is my opinion that I has contrived in the face of challenges of metaethics in the first half of the 20th century, especially, of emotivism, which cast a doubt whether evaluative judgments can build up a science (26). Although emotivism and the enthusiasm about metaethics were already out of date, the problem remains nevertheless what role scientists should play in our society. How about the mesologists?

The process of sublation was given in the answer (iv). My interpretation of 'city' as a community of discourse is somehow abstract. In fact 'city' would range from literally a city (or a partition of city or village) to prefecture, region, nation, and international society. If 'city' as open community of discourse is correspondent to the process of sublation, it would construct a kind of hierarchy. I hope that mesology will go further to integrate social science such as politics and economics etc., because political and economical factors might exert influence at various stages of such a 'city'.

Note

(1) WATSUJI, Tetsuro, *Milieu*, Iwanami, 1979, pp.13-19

(2) BERQUE, Augustin, *Ecoumène: Introduction à l'étude des milieux humains*, translatede by NAKAYAMA Gen, Chikuma, 2002, p.221

(3) Hans Jonas wrote about Heidegger's concept of thrown projection as follows. "What is the throw without the thrower, and without a beyond whence it started? Rather should the existentialist say that the human being [Menschenwesen] -- conscious, caring, and feeling self [fühlendes Selbst] -- has been "thrown up" by nature." (JONAS, Hans, *Das Prinzip Leben*, Suhrkamp, 1997, S.371,(*The Phenomenon of Life*, Northwestern University Press, 1966, p.233. I translated according to the German version. In the English version, "life" was written instead of "Menschenwesen" and "knowing self" instead of "fühlendes Selbst") Jonas pointed out that spirit has been kept away from nature by the ancient Gnosis, Cartesian dualism, and modern existentialism and that this division is resulted in the ignorance of the status of human beings in nature and therefore norms. Jonas

maintained the continuity between nature and human beings in terms of evolution. From other context than Berque's, he sought the status of human beings in the universe and found the special feature of human beings in the ability of making symbol. As to the study of symbol, see "Homo Pictor: Von der Freiheit des Bildens" in ibid. Professor Berque evaluates Jonas positively (BERQUE, Augustin, *Être humains sur la terre, principe d'éthique d'écoumène*, translated by SHINODA, Katsuhide, Chikuma, 1996, p.117) and points out properly that Jonas distinguished the ethical dimension from the ecological one (p.130, ibid.). But he declares that mesology goes further than Jonas, because Jonas' scope remains the vision of mankind as such (p.118, ibid.). Frankly speaking, I cannot realize what it means. The reason is that the principle of responsibility does not only care for human beings and that Jonas' concept of mankind as such means permanent free beings capable to be good or wrong. This image of them is contrary to the one described by utopianism.

(4) Berque, *Ecoumène*, op. cit., p.174

(5) While 'ethic' illustrates the norms helpful to social life, 'ethics' means philosophical thinking about it. Man can distinguish them in English, but there are no correspondent words in French and Germany. In Japan man also tends to confuse one with another. But I dare to adopt these different words to keep the keen awareness of ethics for foundation of norms.

(6) NORTON, Bryan, "Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism", in *Environmental Ethics*, vol.6, n.2

(7) SHINAGAWA, Tetsuhiko, "Environment, Property and Ethic", in *Shisou*, no. 923, Iwanami, 2001. In this context I have criticized Serres' concept of natural contract.

(8) Aldo Leopold's land ethic gets off this criticism. He took humans as ethical agents who intervene in the nature deliberately.

(9) SHINAGAWA, Tetsuhiko, "Nature, Environment and Human Being: Hans Jonas on *the Principle of Responsibility*", in *Arche*, no.7, Kansai Philosophical Association, 1999.

(10) About the criticism of Jonas by discourse ethics, see APEL, Karl-Otto, *Diskurs und Verantwortung*, Suhrkamp, 1997, APEL, Karl-Otto & NIQUET, Marcel, *Diskursethik und Diskursanthropologie*, Alber, 2002, MÜLLER, Wolfgang Erich(Hrsg.), *Hans Jonas – von der Gnosisforschung zur Verantwortungsethik*, Kohlhammer, 2003, BÖHLER, Dietrich(Hrsg.), *Ethik für die Zukunft -- Im Diskurs mit Hans Jonas*, C.H.Beck, 1994

(11) BERQUE, *Ecoumène*, op. cit., p.406

(12) HELD, Klaus, "Le monde natal, le monde ètranger, le monde un", traduit par Raphaël Célis, in *Husserl-Ausgabe und Husserl-Forschung*, Hrsg. Samuel Ijsseling, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990, p.19. This ideas of home-world and world of strangers, which Husserl left in the posthumous texts (*Husserliana* Bd. XIII-XV), and the study of milieu can overlap each other in some respects. Translated into the ideas of mesology, 'home-world' means the medial body, which is familiar to us, while 'world of strangers' means the milieu, where we are compelled to feel that our measures are rejected to apply there.

(13) BERQUE, *Ecoumène*, op. cit., p.382

(14) ibid., p.420

(15) WATSUJI, *Milieu*, op. cit., p.144

(16) BERQUE, *Ecoumène*, op. cit., p.379

(17) ibid., p.380

(18) ibid., p.377

(19) ibid., p.394

(20) ibid., p.406

(21) ibid., p.407

(22) ibid., p.389

(23) ibid., p.22

(24) ibid., pp.384-388

(25) ibid., p.376

(26) SHINAGAWA Tetsuhiko, "The accountability of ethics: bioethics as a clue", in the 50th Symposium of the Japanese Society for Ethics "The 20th Century: Questions of Ethics", *The Reports of the Conference in 1999*, Japanese Society for Ethics, 1999.