The Bernau Manuscripts as a Divide

Some Remarks on the Self-constitution of the Flow of Consciousness and on the Passivity of Consciousness and Unconsciousness

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When we situate the Bernau Manuscripts, which are the result of intensive reflection on consciousness pursued in a rather short period, in the development of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology of time-consciousness, we can hardly say that any absolutely new insights can be found within. Therefore these manuscripts might disappoint those who expect something new from them. It could be said that the manuscripts are nothing other than a rethinking and re-elaboration of problems which were repeatedly taken into consideration especially after around the year 1905.

It is well known that Husserl continued to reflect upon such problems as the constitution of time-objects, protention and retention, impression, remembering and imagination, and so on. It is undeniable that through his continuous efforts of reflection phases of time-consciousness were gradually disclosed. As a master of reflection, Husserl was devoted from the beginning to describing in the smallest detail events that happened in his own consciousness. According to Fink, it was a trial of the vivisection of consciousness.\textsuperscript{1} In other words, the trial meant conducting an thorough investigation into the liveliness of consciousness, which is consistently carried out not only in \textit{Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins},\textsuperscript{2} but also in \textit{Die Bernauer Manuskripte über Zeitbewusstsein} and in the C Manuscripts as well. What is remarkable about the whole course is that Husserl’s reflective glance is directed towards multiple phases of consciousness and that subtle changes come about with respect to used terms as he repeats his reflection. We have also to admit that in describing consciousness he makes continuous efforts to capture its phenomenon full of nuance.

As a consequence of that, it is often the case that the same phases of consciousness were described with different terms. This is clearly seen, when we take notice of the frequency of usage of such terms as “primal impression and primal presentation”, “stream and process”, and so on, which are used in his

\textsuperscript{1} Cf. Eugen Fink, \textit{Nähe und Distanz}, Alber 1976, S.219.
\textsuperscript{2} Hua X has been translated into English as: \textit{On the Phenomenology of the consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)}. Translated by J.B.Brough(Edmund Husserl Collected Works Volume IV), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. In the following this work will be indicated as CW IV.
earlier and middle stages. However what is far more remarkable is that his
descriptions are carried out based upon a genetic standpoint from the beginning
of his Phenomenology of Inner-Time-Consciousness. It is certain that we can
acknowledge the development of the genetic phenomenology in Ideen 2, the
Bernau Manuscripts, Analyses of Passive Synthesis and the C Manuscripts. But
if we consider that one characteristic of the genetic phenomenology lies in its
attempt to elucidate the historicity of consciousness and that it reflects events of
consciousness in accordance with their order in time, we
can glimpse such a characteristic already in the Phenomenology of
Inner-Time-Consciousness. It goes without saying that such a characteristic is
much more clearly acknowledged in the Bernau Manuscripts. We can also notice
in both writings that, through reflective description of the genetic mode of
consciousness, the phenomena of the self-constitution of consciousness and of the
self-appearing of consciousness are insisted upon. However there are significant
differences between the former and the latter.

One of the differences is that in the Bernau Manuscripts the consciousness of
stream is considered in relation to the self-constitution of the stream of
consciousness. The problem concerning the consciousness of stream is absent in
the Phenomenology of Inner-Time-Consciousness. The other difference is that the
problem of the I is taken into consideration from the genetic perspective in the
manuscripts, in which the passive side of the I is reflected upon in connection
with the primal self-constitution of the stream of consciousness. But in reflecting
on the active side of the I, who is the subject of actions, Husserl’s interest is
directed not only to the self-constitution of the stream of consciousness and the
self-appearing of consciousness, but also to the passive course of consciousness,
which continues to elapse on its own.

In connection with this problem, it must be pointed out that events of which the
I is unable to be conscious are regarded as those belonging to an unconscious
dimension. Accordingly, the manner in which the course of consciousness is
described changes. Later on, in the 1920’s the problem of the passivity of
consciousness was considered in greater detail in the Analyses of the Passive
Synthesis. The genetic theory of the I partly developed in the Bernau
Manuscripts is related to the problem concerning the self-temporization or the
self-constitution of the I which is intensively treated in the C Manuscripts.
Therefore we can find a double point of view towards consciousness, i.e. the
spontaneity and passivity of consciousness, in the Bernau Manuscripts.
Descriptions sustained by this double viewpoint are to be combined with an
analysis of the passivity of consciousness and the theory of the I.
I. The problem of the spontaneity of consciousness and its genetic analysis in the Phenomenology of Inner-Time-Consciousness

As I have already shown, after he had brought the problem of the I into his reflective glance in the Bernau Manuscripts, Husserl was inclined to see the becoming of consciousness as passivity or a passive intentionality in comparison with activity or the active intentionality of the I. But in the Phenomenology of Inner-Time-Consciousness, which lacks any reference to the problem of the I, Husserl fixed his reflective eyes on the phase in which consciousness constitutes itself in an incomparable way. This phase is called “a primal spontaneity of consciousness” (CW IV, 106). According to Husserl, it “brings what has been primally generated to growth, to development” (CW IV, 106). Impression is something new “that has come into being alien to consciousness, that has been received, as opposed to what has been produced through consciousness’s own spontaneity” (CW IV, 106). A characteristic of this spontaneity is that it brings what has been received to growth. This is a spontaneous operation which consciousness constitutes by itself in its own stream and which emerges by itself without any participation of the I. Consciousness never fails to develop what has been received in a manner unnoticed by the I.

The manner in which consciousness constitutes its own stream by itself can seduce us to conflate the state of life and consciousness because of the former’s incessant self-maintaining nature. Concretely speaking, in a restaurant it is we who chose what to eat, but it is the spontaneous force of life which brings what has been taken in our stomach to digestion and excretion. Similar things can be said about consciousness. It seems to be difficult to deny that Husserl acknowledged the similarity between consciousness and life. In fact he even says with regard to memory that “…memory flows continuously, since the life of consciousness flows continuously and does not merely piece itself together link by link into a chain. Rather, everything new reacts on the old; the forward-directed intention belonging to the old is fulfilled and determined in this way…” (CW IV, 56). As is indicated here in these phrases, on the level of the life of consciousness, events which occur in consciousness never cease to influence each other, so that there is no gap among past, present and future, which are incessantly penetrating and resonating together. Through the description of such inter-influencing phenomena, Husserl tries to grasp the modes where consciousness constitutes itself in streaming in a miraculous way.

An example of what can be noticed in describing one phase of such phenomena is the verb “terminate”. Referring to apprehensions in the case of perception, Husserl says, “The apprehensions continuously blend into one another here; they terminate in an apprehension that constitutes the now, but which is only an ideal
This verb “terminate” means the mode where, with retentional modifications, phenomena sink from the present into the past and return back to the new present without exception. The present is a *terminus a qua* of the phenomenon which flows into the past and a *terminus ad quem* of the phenomenon which flows back to the present.

Owing to the continuous reviving of the past into the present, the present is always in the course of growing. “Something objective itself -the flight of birds- appears as primally given in the now-point but fully given in a continuum of the past that terminates in the now and continually terminates on an ever new now, while what has continuously preceded recedes ever further into the continuum of the past” (CW IV, 71). The phenomenon of the past recurring into the new present can be possible when consciousness constitutes itself in its own way without any relation with the I. Husserl says that “every perception points back to infinite nexus of perceptions (a multiple infinity)” (CW IV, 110). He also insists that in the case of memory, a “series of memories that empty into the actually present now” (CW IV, 110) are together with each memory. As to the connection between current perceptions and the chain of memories, he says that “the memorial intentions (as unilaterally directed) terminate in the perception” (CW IV, 111). Thus every perception which “passes over from now to now and, in anticipation, goes to meet the new now” (CW IV, 112) is always together with a series of memories because they never fail to completely empty into the present. His intonation of such an influence of that which empties into the present is eminently acknowledged when he says that “the present is always born from the past, a determinate present from a determinate past” (CW IV, 111). Considering this influence of the past on the present, we have to admit that the influence never comes from the I. It originates from the activity of consciousness, which means that the influence is produced by consciousness itself. In other words, it can be regarded as a product of the self-constitution of consciousness. As has been stated, for Husserl this self-constitution was nothing but the primal spontaneity of consciousness. This self-constitution was also regarded as a dimension of “absolute subjectivity” (CW IV, 79). By the adjective “absolute”, Husserl means a primal origin from which any act of the I emerges.

The spontaneity of consciousness should be understood in the sense that consciousness constitutes itself by itself in its streaming. Therefore it refers to the unification of consciousness. It is well known that Husserl often posed a problem concerning the possibility of the unity of the stream of consciousness. One of his famous insights is stated as follows “two inseparably united intentionalities, requiring one another like two sides of one and the same thing, are interwoven with each other in the one, unique flow of consciousness” (CW IV, 87). Two intentionalities that cannot be identified with act-intentionality of the I
are considered to be the function through which consciousness constitutes itself in the flow of consciousness. It is nothing but the spontaneity of consciousness that makes the function itself possible. Self-appearance of the flow cannot be possible without such spontaneity, which “brings what has been primally generated to growth, to development” (CW IC, 106). This means that the source of the unity of the stream of consciousness should be looked for in the spontaneous self-constitution of consciousness itself; the self-appearance of the flow does not require a second flow; on the contrary, it constitutes itself as a phenomenon in itself” (CW IV, 88).

What has thus been stated refers to only one aspect of considerations about the problem concerning spontaneity and liveliness of the flow of consciousness insisted upon in the Phenomenology of Inner-Time Consciousness. This problem is repeatedly reflected upon in the Bernau manuscripts in which we can notice two characteristics, including the persistence of the spontaneity of consciousness as his main target of reflection. The other characteristic is his attempt to grasp consciousness on the level of passivity. In the next section I would like to deal with the problem concerning the spontaneity of consciousness.

II. The problem concerning the self-consciousness of the flow (the spontaneity of consciousness) and its self-constitution in the Bernau Manuscripts

The problem of the self-constitution of the flow which is indicated in the quoted phrase “[the flow] constitutes itself as phenomenon in itself” (CW IV, 88) can be connected with the problem of how the flow of consciousness can unite its flow in its flowing. The self-constitution of the flow is a process of its self-unification. This means that the flow unifies itself through its self-constitution. While this problem of the self-constitution is combined with “an ultimate, truly absolute” which is simply mentioned in the chapter 81 of the Ideen 1, it is reflected upon on the one hand in connection with the self-appearance of the flow in the Bernau Manuscripts. “Consciousness is the flow of consciousness, which appears in itself as flow”(Hua XXXIII, 44). But on the other hand, the mode of the self-appearance of the flow of consciousness and of the unity of consciousness is considered in relation to the self-consciousness of flow itself. This self-consciousness indicates the state in which the flow of consciousness knows itself as flow in its flowing.

According to Husserl, “being of the flow is a perception of itself” (Hua XXXIII, 44). But what does this statement mean? If, as Husserl often says, the flow of consciousness is “a perpetual Heraclitean flux” (CW, 360) or eternal process, it would not possible to be conscious of the whole of the flow. Does it then mean that the flow of consciousness is conscious of its own parts. But we have to admit that since the flow is a process of incessant modifications, it would not be possible to
objectify its own parts. In this case, we have to consider a consciousness which would not have an object to be conscious of and which would nevertheless not lose the characteristic of “conscious of”. What is there to be conscious of in this case?

Is there any consciousness which would have no object at all? Considering this problem concerning the self-perception of consciousness, Husserl says “that an omniscient ‘godlike’ consciousness which include itself with a complete clearness grows as ‘idée’” (Hua XXXIII, 46) He adds furthermore “that the ‘finite’ consciousness is omniscient” (Hua XXXIII, 46). Consciousness is also considered to be simultaneously forward and backward directed, which means it has a double horizon within itself (Cf. Hua XXXIII, 46). Based upon Husserl’s description of consciousness we could suppose that consciousness which has no determined object is nothing other than a consciousness that “knows” everything in its own way. What is insisted upon in terms of the omniscience of consciousness is that all phases of consciousness and their intertwinement are penetrated by a special kind of intentionality and that within them “a perpetual consciousness of the flow” (Hua XXXIII, 47) functions. In other words, what he means by the term “the omniscience of consciousness” is that the perpetual consciousness of the flow pervades all phases of consciousness. According to Husserl, any event of consciousness which occurs actually in the present is combined with the whole of the past and the future and consciousness knows that in its own way. Therefore owing to this special “knowledge” of consciousness it can intentionally unify its multiple streams. If it were not for this knowledge, multiple streams, one phase of which goes on into the future and the other of which passes away into the past, would become muddy streams and lose their way. In other words, the knowledge can prevent streams from muddling and its intentional function can bring all phases of consciousness into unity. This function can be defined as a center of the self-constitution of the flow of consciousness. This constitution means the state in which consciousness constitutes itself in its streaming. “The eternal, incessant process” (Hua XXXIII, 31) is a self-conscious process of the flow of consciousness and its intentional, unifying process.

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the descriptions in the Bernau Manuscripts is that Husserl devotes himself to reflection on process, which he regarded as “absolute subjectivity” or “an ultimate, truly absolute” in previous days. The adjective “absolute” or “ultimate” can be synonym with “original” in the sense that any event of consciousness occurs from an origin. The original dimension means “time-consciousness” when Husserl states in Ideen 1 that experience constitutes itself in the original time-consciousness as a unity which expands in phenomenological time (Hua III, 291). But even though he says that the unity of the flow of the original time-consciousness is a unity which includes
various events, he rarely describes how the original time-consciousness itself can occur.

In the Bernau Manuscripts the problem of the occurrence of time-consciousness is repeatedly reflected on and through this reflection its dynamic character is disclosed. Dynamism of the flow of the time-consciousness indicates the state in which events in the streaming present interweave with past experience and the future which is coming to the present. Under such intertwinement they are always becoming and resonating each other. What is happening there is a spontaneous combination of a consciousness with another consciousness, through which consciousness can change its figure. In this case it is consciousness itself in the streaming or its special kind of knowing that determines the way of binding of each consciousness.

It is certain that the process where events in the flow of consciousness influence themselves and the process where, through the inter-influencing, consciousness constitutes itself have been reflected upon since the early 1900's. The phenomenon of the emptying of a series of memories into the present is already stated as an example. But in the Bernau Manuscripts far more consistent reflection on the inter-influencing process is developed. In this reflection especially the relations between perception and retention, retention and protention and so on are taken into consideration. Such phenomena of interwovenness are also considered in connection with the processes the flow of consciousness constitutes.

What Husserl concludes in making notice of such phenomena is that the original process of self-constitution of the flow of consciousness is a spontaneous process of consciousness. This process is often called a “primal process”. “This primal process is process, but it is not constituted in the same way as objects of the immanent time” (Hua XXXIII, 122). Objects of the immanent time can be constituted in the primal process but this process never ceases to constitute itself in its becoming. This self constituting process of consciousness is more often combined with life in the Manuscripts because Husserl identifies consciousness with life itself. “Consciousness is life” (Hua XXXIII, 69) is his firm conviction.

We never hesitate to say that life is not controlled by us. On the contrary, life itself is the ultimate foundation which sustains our existence and activity. Life is continuously working night and day. According to Husserl, any concrete life is “a unity of the pulse of life which is always new” (Hua XXXIII, 69). Based upon an identification of life with consciousness, within the flow of consciousness he notices the same function as life developing itself in its own way. Just as life grounds our existence, so the self-constituting flow of consciousness is the ultimate dimension which makes any activity of the I possible. But we should not think that the flow of consciousness which constitutes itself is always beforehand
and the flow makes any activity of the I possible afterwards. It would be impossible to separate the flow of consciousness and the activity of the I, not only because the former influences the latter, but because the former receives the activity in its flowing and it again continues to influence the subsequent activities of the I in a new way. Consequently under such interconnection the flow of consciousness never stops changing its figure.

One example which shows the influencing force of the flow of consciousness on the I is “a force of motivation” (Hua XXXIII, 377). The force originating from the flow of consciousness is that which is immanent in it, namely that which is sedimentations of the past experience. Every act of the I always starts with the force which originates from the flow or the process of consciousness. As has been stated, this process is not only process, but consciousness of the process (See Hua XXXIII, 368). In connection with this, Husserl adds that “a necessary protentional motivation which indicates the style of the process as a necessary primal form of consciousness belongs to the process”(Hua XXXIII, 369). It is the assistance of the force of motivation in the intentional activity of the I that is insisted upon with this phrase.

Another example is the phenomenon of “stimulation” which, through coming up to the present from the past, influences the I. This stimulation can be understood as a kind of spontaneity within the flow of consciousness. “The perceived early provides stimulation from the darkness” (Hua XXXIII, 367). The phenomenon of the stimulation is expressed with verbs such as rising up (emportauchen), springing up (auftauchen). These are always influencing the present of the I and are considered as “modes which belong to the horizon of the original intention” (Hua XXXIII, 363). This means that those modes refer to the I, whether it is in action or is sleeping, and that they determine it from within.

What can be possible under such determination is passive memory of the I and in this situation the I can be directed to memory, owing to the spontaneity that is latent in the flow of consciousness. By adopting the term “affection,” which is similar to “stimulation,” Husserl also indicates the state in which the I turns to the objects of the affection. Taking up sensuous desire as an example of the affection, he says that “sensuous desires are affection on the I” (Hua XXXIII, 276). Concretely speaking, the I can be pulled by desires(Cf. Hua XXXIII, 276). It is certain that by this example he contrasts the spontaneity of the flow of consciousness with the passivity of the I.

The point of view that insists upon the primal spontaneity of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Inner-Time-Consciousness is succeeded by the problem of the self-consciousness of the flow in the Bernau Manuscripts. In this problem it is the phenomenon of consciousness constituting itself in its flowing through its self-consciousness that is reflected upon. In correlation with that, the passive
side of the I is also taken into consideration. The characteristic of these manuscripts are not restricted to the point of solely reflecting upon the flow of consciousness and the processes of its intentional self-unification or the process of its active self-constitution. Another important characteristic is that, with repetition of the problem concerning consciousness of the flow of consciousness, the activity of the reflecting I is focused and that the flow of consciousness is understood as a passively developing flow under the reflective point of view. What is still more important is that: the problem concerning the dimension of unconsciousness emerges when Husserl poses the problem of whether the primal process which is flowing ahead of reflection is an unconscious process. In the next section I would like to consider this problem from the standpoint of the flow of consciousness and the consciousness of the flow.

III. From the flow of consciousness to the consciousness of the flow---the spontaneity of consciousness, the passivity of consciousness and unconsciousness

The germ of the problem concerning the flow of consciousness and the consciousness of the flow is already acknowledged when he writes in the Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness that “the succession of sensations and the sensation of successions are not the same” (CW, 12) and “perception of succession presupposes succession of perception” (CW, 195). This problem is intensively reflected upon in the Bernau Manuscripts, in which Husserl repeats a series of questions. How can a succession of consciousness become the consciousness of a succession? (Hua XXXIII, 96) How is consciousness of a succession possible? (Hua XXXIII, 97) What is there to say about the consciousness of lively streaming? (Hua XXXIII, 47). The problem refers to “the consciousness of the flowing” (Hua XXXIII, 90), which, needless to say, concerns the possibility of the reflection of the flowing. Although the problem concerning the self-consciousness of the flow of consciousness and its self-constitution is considered in the reflection of the flow of consciousness, the problem of the consciousness of the flow of consciousness is related to the question of what way, and to what degree can we reflect upon the flow of consciousness? The impossibility of reflection on the reflection of the flow of consciousness means that since the reflection of the flow of consciousness is in itself flowing, reflection on the reflection of the flow of consciousness is ultimately incapable of grasping the flow itself because of a fall into infinite regress. In connection with this, the problem of infinite regress which emerges with the passage from the consciousness of the flow to the consciousness of the consciousness of the flow and a problem concerning the glance of the I who reflects the flow of consciousness are repeatedly taken into consideration.
What is essential to notice here is that as the problem concerning the I who reflects on the flow and its activity takes a central position, the reflected flow is inclined to be considered as a passive process. Events of consciousness that pass from the present into the past are considered as passive process under reflective consciousness. Besides, the flow of consciousness is separated into reflected process and process prior to reflection. The latter is understood as an unconscious process. It is undeniable that these problems which are fragmentarily treated in the Bernau Manuscripts have to wait until the Analysis of Passive Synthesis for a fully developed conclusion. But based upon the fragment of the manuscripts I would like to think about the problem of the passivity of consciousness.

Before considering the problem of the passivity, let us briefly examine Husserl's description of the flow of consciousness. What should not be forgotten is that any event of consciousness which is actually occurring can be possible only in the primally self-constituting flow of consciousness as an ultimate dimension. “The phenomenal time, the transcendental first phase is possible only through a most inner, transcendental time of the second phase and in a final transcendental occurrence, the infinite process itself, which for itself consciousness of the process” (Hua XXXIII, 29). What is clearly described here is that, as was stated in the section II, a primal self-conscious process which constitutes itself always exists beforehand and any present event of consciousness can occur in the process.

Husserl says that “we are always standing in the middle of an infinite process” (Hua XXXIII, 28) and suggests a twofold branch in the flow of consciousness stretching from the middle, one of which is called the “upper branch” (Hua XXXIII, 28) and the other of which is called the “under branch” (Hua XXXIII, 28). The former is a process of fulfillment and the latter is a process in which the fulfillment gradually loses its vivacity. The twofold branch is supposed to be an eternal, incessant process, which flowing endlessly in the opposite directions of the future and of the past (Cf. Hua XXXIII, 31). We should not conceive of the two flows as separate from each other. On the contrary, Husserl often insists that the two directions of the flow should be considered as fused together. On the other hand, it is evident that Husserl was never completely satisfied with insisting upon the flow of unified consciousness and he tried to resolve the flow into two directions.

It is the under branch that Husserl identifies as a phenomenon of passivity of consciousness when he relates himself with the two directions of the flow. The phenomenon can be connected to what he calls “that which is taking place in the passivity of the necessary fading away” (Hua XXXIII, 68). The process is regarded as “passive givenness” (Hua XXXIII, 69). The adjective “passive” means that which takes place in the spontaneous, primal process modifies itself and
sinks into the past. The I cannot participate in this process of modification, which is considered as a process of fading away “by itself” (Hua XXXIII, 367f). The expression “by itself” means that any event of consciousness in the present elapses passively and naturally into the past. Though the present in which new primal impressions emerge incessantly is a process of lively primal temporalisation (Cf. Hua XXXIII, 70), “the primally produced sinks away without its own liveliness (Hua XXXIII, 70). In this case the state in which liveliness is being lost in the sinking process is even called “dead”. What is implicated by this adjective is that although the present is “a lively period of becoming” (Hua XXXIII, 135), what takes place there is obliged to retreat from the present. The verbs such as flow away, fade away, sink, disappear indicate a process which elapses by itself.

This phenomenon of the passivity of consciousness is especially connected with the remembering by the I. One example of the connection is shown in the second chapter of the text 22 entitled “Various kind of unclearness and undeterminedness in the process of fulfilling. Passive and active progress in the remembering. In this chapter, in which remembered images that lie in front of “the remembering glance” (Hua XXXIII, 382) are described, it is the passivity of remembering that Husserl considers above all. “Remembering can be a passivity of remembering, remembering can come as ‘an irruption’…” (Hua XXXIII, 385). Active remembering is a process based upon the will of the I which positively wants to bring the past experience into the present, while passive remembering is a process in which something unexpected comes up to the present all of a sudden from the darkness of consciousness.

We could say that this latter process is possible due to the spontaneity of consciousness or the self-constitution of the flow of consciousness if we understand that a sediment comes up to the present in its own way “by itself” in the process. But Husserl does not refer to the self-constitution of the flow of consciousness with respect to remembering. He instead takes notice of its passive side. For he describes the phenomenon of remembering in relation to the remembering I and he does so by contrasting active remembering of the I with the passive one. Consequently the former is regarded as a phenomenon belonging to the freedom of the I and the latter as a passive event which the I can not control at all. The phenomenon of passivity means, in other words, that something happens in a way the I is never conscious of, so that this unnoticed happening can be related to the problem of unconsciousness.

The problem of unconsciousness is fragmentally considered in the Bernau Manuscripts, more so in the 5th and 6th section of Text 10 as well as Appendix 5. The 5th section starts with the question of “Is there an untemporal and unconscious primal life?” (Hua XXXIII, 195) and the 6th section is entitled
“Further consideration of the hypothesis that the constitution of the temporality were things of a later comprehension of an untemporal and unconscious primal process”(Hua XXXIII, 200). In these sections Husserl is essentially concerned with the primal process that is always ahead of the consciousness of the flow, namely the reflection of the flow.

His question can be rephrased to ask how does the flow of consciousness constitutes itself, before it is objectified by the consciousness of the flow. For this question, he gives no definite answer but he only supposes that there might be or should be an unconscious process including the primal process composed of the moment of hyle (Hua XXXIII, 200f). His hesitation is warranted because an unconsciousness that can be an object of consciousness is unconsciousness no more. It would be natural that we speak of unconsciousness with assumptions. But surprisingly in a part of his reflection, Husserl states a fundamental principle that “every sensing, every comprehension, all hyletic and noetic is fundamentally a succession of unconscious processes, based upon which apprehension becomes possible and through which consciousness of the succession and continuing objects becomes possible” (Hua XXXIII, 201). What he insists upon here is that the flow of consciousness itself which differs from the consciousness of the flow is nothing but an unconscious flow and that any appearing act of consciousness which is prior to reflection is occurring in an unnoticed way. This means that even though reflection can catch only elapsed phases of the flow of consciousness, this flow of consciousness in which reflection becomes possible is an unconscious primal process. It is obvious that this problem concerning the limits of reflection is repeatedly considered in the problematic issue of reflection on the lively present in the C Manuscripts. But the especially notable of the Bernau Manuscripts is that antagonistic insights into the flow of consciousness can be found at every turn.

Thus, Husserl on the one hand acknowledges within the flow of consciousness a special kind of consciousness, namely an omniscient consciousness that sees through the whole of the flow of consciousness. On the other hand, he takes notice of not only the phenomenon of consciousness which passively elapses from the present into the past by itself, but also the unconscious flow of consciousness called a primal process. We might say that Husserl gazes steadily at the state indicated by the expression “by itself” which in turn could be understood with double meaning, namely in the sense of spontaneous or actively and naturally or passively. As far as the spontaneity of consciousness is concerned, he insists upon the omniscience of the present consciousness, which means that the present consciousness is in the state of being conscious of everything. The flowing present unnoticed by the I is, on the other hand, considered to be an unconscious process. Here we have two kinds of the present, one of which is a so called bright present,
the other a dark present.

We should not forget that unconsciousness in the Husserlian sense differs from unconsciousness in Freudian sense, the latter being located in the depth of consciousness. As far as the Bernau Manuscripts are concerned, we could say that the term unconsciousness is related to the standpoint of the I, meaning that the flow of consciousness which can not be reflected as such is nothing but unconscious flow. This also means that the present always remains dark to the I to the extent that the I is unable to know what occurs in the present flow of consciousness. In terms of the darkness of the actual present we could understand that something mysterious or strange is happening in unnoticed way before the reflective glance of the I. Therefore it could be said that there is an enigma or an unconscious, dark dimension in the living present.

This dimension can be related to the ultimate, which is ahead of any reflective grasping and which is considered a primal time-constituting process or “primal continual succession” (Hua XXXIII, 222). This dimension is nothing but a primal time-constituting flow of consciousness, which is also called “a final transcendental event” (Hua XXXIII, 69), “a final flow of consciousness” (Hua XXXIII, 163). But this primal self-constituting process can never be re-constituted. This process is a fundamental origin from which every constitution of immanent time-objects becomes possible and from which the reflection of the I can emerge. This reflection can catch only one part of the process which has been modified in the past but it can never reach a process which flows before the reflection starts. Therefore this primal process is regarded as an unconscious one.

As is stated above, the ultimate self-constituting flow of consciousness itself can not be constituted by another flow of consciousness. The ultimate flow is also an unconscious one in the sense that it can not be the object of reflective consciousness. The consciousness of the flow of consciousness itself which occurs as a “primal continual succession” (Hua XXXIII, 222) can not be reflected upon, so that we can say that the consciousness of the flow itself belongs to the unconscious flow. This means that something unknown lies behind in the middle of the living present of the I and that the I is incessantly influenced by it in an unnoticed way. Therefore we have to admit that, because of the darkness of the living present, the I is unable to ascertain its direction.

But we should not forget that this sort of darkness is peculiar to the I. On the contrary, the primal self-constituting flow of consciousness should be regarded as something bright which gains insight into the past and the future. It follows that the passive character of the living present and its unconscious darkness are brought into relief when the flow of consciousness and the consciousness of the flow are considered. On the other hand, the brightness of consciousness and its
activity which unify its flow in an incomparable way are insisted upon when the primal self-constituting process of the flow of consciousness is reflected. But the emphasis on the spontaneity of consciousness which is eminent in the Bernau Manuscripts is transferred to an emphasis on the activity of the I as Husserl turned his interest toward the problem of the I. The problem of the passivity of consciousness comes to be considered more and more in the Analyses of Passive Synthesis. In light of the later stages developed from the manuscripts, we would be allowed to say that the spontaneity of consciousness is especially emphasized in the manuscripts and that the wonder of time-consciousness refers to the state in which consciousness constitutes itself freely as it chooses.

References