Conclusion

The objective of this paper is to show how the provision of assistance in operations and technical study and training for the Usiminas project had to be mainly carried out on site by adopting the “show how” format.

Because technical study and training had not been instituted in Japan, it was conducted on site at the plant using a “show how” format. Moreover, the training was conducted on a discretionary basis, both on the part of the plant personnel and the Brazilian engineers in such a manner that it was often improvisational, incorporating a large component of self-study in which the participants observed the operations. In this case, the participants assumed the position solely of observers, while the Japanese only demonstrated the technique. In addition to the direct effect of “being shown how” on site, there were also important indirect effects, such as, the participants were able to view the Japanese steel industry as a model of their efforts.

As illustrated by the fact that the Japanese technical assistance personnel who were dispatched to offer assistance in operations and training were responsible for the production lines and actual operations, their stance consisted of “showing (the Brazilians) how” that is, “Sossen Suihan”―“leadership by example.” This was done in order to avoid problems associated with acquiring the necessary skills (“operational skills”) to operate a large-scale steelworks. The individuals who had received training in Japan were assigned to the Japanese division and section managers as assistants. At this stage, the training progressed to a level at which the participants “observed the procedure and at the same time attempted to execute the procedures themselves” and the Japanese personnel “showed the Brazilians the technique and also got them to execute the work hands-on.”

As part of the training formats “show (the Brazilians) how” and “lead by example,” the Japanese technical assistance personnel were responsible for the production lines and the actual operations. This situation led to the issue of transfer of control. The decision regarding when the control should be transferred depended more on the time constraints than a determination of the appropriate timing with regard to the technical capacity of the Brazilians. In other words, there was no other choice but to carry out the transfer in a mechanized manner. Despite the concerns of the Japanese unit, the move was essentially considered a success. From the Brazilian perspective, this was a shift from participatory observation to executing the work in reality, while from the Japanese perspective, following the transfer of control, their position changed to that of observers. This implies that at this point, the program had evolved from a situation where one side was “showing” and the other “observing.” This process necessarily involved decisions on the Japanese unit, while with regard to the Brazilian unit, the fact that they had actually taken charge of the work was the beginning of their success in the venture.

Moreover, the operational and technical assistance provided for the Usiminas project, which mainly focused on the “show how” format, involved a conversion of both the technical assistance (Japanese) side and the receiving end of the assistance (the Brazilian side). In other words, the individuals trained in Japan were initially only observers during their stay in Japan, following which they became participatory observers during their training in Brazil prior to the transfer of control, and eventually took charge (pure doer) after the transfer of control. The Japanese side, on the other hand, acted purely as the demonstrating side (pure doer) during the training in Japan, while in Brazil they observed as they demonstrated, and subsequent to the transfer of control, they took the position of pure observers. Thus, it can be said that “technology transfer by people” was implemented in this manner.