Technical Study in Japan and Technical Assistance by Japanese Steel Industry for Start-up Operation of Usiminas, Brazil 1
Shin Hasegawa
The Shogaku Ronshu: the Business Review of Kansai University
Vol. 47, Nos. 2 & 3 (Double Issue), September 2002
(English version)
I Introduction
The integrated iron and steelmaking works of Usiminas, 2 Brazil, which was built between the latter half of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, was the first instance of technology transfer in the steel industry from Japan to Brazil and an example of a typical successful endeavor. It is also considered a prototype of postwar Japanese technology transfer and technical cooperation. As noted in a previous paper, 3 I considered the concept pointed out by Takabumi Hayashi—“technology transfer by people (face-to-face)”—within the context of the entire technology transfer process to be a defining characteristic of Japanese technology transfer systems. I then proceeded to explore how and when “technology transfer by people (face-to-face)” 4 was applied to the Usiminas Construction Project, using the concept of the project life cycle for the purpose of analysis. My findings clearly show that “technology transfer by people” was a factor in the operations throughout the completion of the steelworks, spanning the phases of feasibility study (FS), basic design, detailed design, procurement, construction, and preparation for the launch of operations. The training and education aspect (including guidance pertaining to construction, installation, and operations and technical education and training) in which “technology transfer by people (face-to-face)” is most prevalent is the most significant aspect in the construction and launch of the project preparation phases.
Based on the findings of my previous paper, I examined the conditions and methods of the operational and technical education and training provided when Usiminas was launched from the perspective of the trends of engineers who conducted technical studies in Japan. 5 The clear implication of my study is that the only option was the provision of operational and technical training and education mainly by “showing how” on site. To summarize at this stage, the process of “showing how” requires not only the object on which a procedure is demonstrated (e.g., machinery in the case of a factory) but also observers since this process involves interaction between the demonstrator and the observer. If the demonstrator is the provider of technical cooperation and the observer is the receiver, the act of the demonstrator “showing” the observer is a form of “technology transfer by people.” Further, as per the definition, the process of “showing (someone) how”—the demonstration of the actual procedure by the demonstrator—can only be accomplished “on site.”
This paper is organized as follows. The next section—Section II—examines the manner in which technical study and training is conducted in Japan; Section III discusses the scale and responsibilities of personnel dispatched from Japan; and Section IV explains the manner in which operational guidance and technical/educational training is provided locally. I present the conclusion in Section V.
II Technical Study in Japan
As discussed in my previous paper, the recruitment and education (technical training) of operational personnel belong to the preparation phase for the launch of operations. In this phase, technical cooperation in the form of guidance with regard to operations was carried out. With regard to the Usiminas Project, technical education and training of operational personnel was carried out in both Brazil and Japan. This chapter will discuss the technical assistance provided in Japan, which preceded locally based training, in terms of the scale of personnel dispatched, type of training, and its impact.
1 Dispatch of Engineers from Brazil to Japan
The technical study conducted in Japan was based on the “Agreement on Japan-Brazil Steel Production Joint Venture Company Establishment” (also known as the Lanari-Horikoshi Agreement). 6 In September of the year following the Agreement (1958), 10 engineers were sent from Brazil to Japan for technical study. Among these, seven younger, unmarried engineers (hereafter referred to as Study Group A) 7 stayed for a duration of 15 months, while the remaining three married, middle-rank engineers (Study Group B) remained in Japan for nine months. The study was conducted mainly at Yawata Iron & Steel. 8
Further, another group, referred to as Study Group C 9 that comprised three middle-rank engineers, was sent to Yawata Works and other plants for education in 1960 for one year under the Sociedad Latino Americana (a technical cooperation plan for Central and South America). It is also believed that under the abovementioned plan additional engineers were sent to Japan as part of the Usiminas Construction Project in the following years. In addition, middle-rank engineers 10 who were dispatched to Fuji Iron & Steel for study after being posted at the Comissão de Compras de Tóquio (CCT) were also sent to Japan. 11 Although it is difficult to arrive at an exact overall figure, it is believed that a total of approximately 20 engineers were dispatched. Next, I shall discuss the technical study undertaken by the 13 individuals, the lucid details of which are available.
The seven engineers of Group A had specialized in the following: (1) coke, (2) sintering, (3) steelmaking, (4) heavy plating, (5) measuring devices and combustion (later switching to heavy plating), (6) metallurgy, and (7) quality control. The three engineers in Group B were engaged in the following: (1) blast furnaces, (2) electrical machinery, and (3) assistance with transport and operations. Group C, on the other hand, was engaged in the following activities: (1) refractory lining, (2) steel production and quality control, and (3) blooming. 12 Amongst these, the engineer who focused on coke (A1) was assigned mainly to Fuji Iron & Steel, while two others (A3 and C2) were assigned mainly to Yawata Iron & Steel. An analysis of their areas of specialization in this manner shows that a minimum of one or two engineers were assigned to each specialization. 13 The study period of Groups A and B overlapped but there is no overlap in the study period in the case of C. Although engineers A3 and C2 specialized in the same field, their study periods did not overlap. Since the main plant facilities of blast furnaces Nos. 1 and 2 as well as the coke furnace were completed in 1959, the study period of the 13 engineers (1958–61) overlapped with the first half of the construction phase of the Usiminas Construction Project (1958–1965). The engineers returned to their country a year or two before the launch of the coke-oven operations in 1962. 14
The fact that this education was provided in Japan only for key manager-class employees is unusual in terms of the type of training that ordinarily accompanies large-scale steel plant construction. In most cases that involve the construction and operations of new steel plants, technical education and training is provided not only for manager-class employees but also for those working more than one shift, including the foreman class employees who actually run the equipment and operator-class workers. 15 However, when Usiminas was launched, recruitment to the foreman-class was deferred due to delays in the construction phase stemming from issues related to foreign currency and problems encountered in procuring funds. Due to the resultant time constraints involved in sending employees to Japan, the training was limited to middle-rank employees. 16
2 Study Format
With regard to the technical study at Yawata Steelworks, the Personnel and Education Department at Yawata developed a study schedule at the request of the head office of Yawata Iron & Steel. 17 Based on this schedule, Groups A and B spent 2–3 months prior to their arrival in Japan acquiring English skills and developing study plans. During the initial 2–3 months in Japan, all these individuals studied in each of the equipment departments. 18 Group C also underwent the same study for one month. 19
Subsequently, each Brazilian engineer was provided with a desk and a locker at “sub-centers” located near plant facilities corresponding to their planned field of specialization where they continued their study. These sub-centers were the offices wherein, for example, in the case of blast furnace facilities, the employees in charge of on-site operations (i.e., on-site managers, technicians, and administrative employees) were stationed. 20 The sub-centers generally corresponded to the Brazilian engineers’ fields of specialization. A maximum of one or two engineers were accepted in each sub-center at a time. The first week of training at the sub-centers comprised, for example, engineers slated to work in the field of blooming by undergoing training in the blooming process on site followed by a week of general training in each of the areas of production (i.e., coke, raw materials yard, sintering, blast furnace, etc.), after which they continued their training in the blooming process. In the following week, ongoing training in the Brazilian engineer’s area of specialization was supplemented by additional training (consisting mainly of observation and question-and-answer sessions) related to unclear issues in the training received thus far. Subsequently, the Brazilian engineers once again returned to their main posts. 21
Next, I shall describe the manner in which the specialized weekly study was carried out at the sub-centers as well as the people who were involved in it and the manner in which they participated. The weekly curriculum was formulated and implemented by regular daytime technical employees (university graduate engineers) with the approval of their manager at the sub-centers where the Brazilian engineers were posted. 22 The lecture topics in the curriculum were determined by study coordinators; this implied that the schedule was not necessarily fixed. Lectures on specific topics lasting approximately one hour each were delivered to the Brazilian engineers 1–3 times a week. Pre-existing engineering documentation (drawings and other documentation) was translated and distributed to the Brazilian engineers along with oral explanations.
With regard to certain types of operations that can only be observed during certain periods (e.g., roll-changing of rolling mill and brick-drying of soaking pit), the lectures and observation periods were accommodated in the schedule of these operations. On an average, the study coordinators spent an hour with the Brazilian engineers whenever possible. In addition, the Brazilian engineers were allowed to observe on-site operations whenever necessary even when the coordinator was not available. This enabled the Brazilian engineers to gain a deeper awareness of the issues. The Brazilian engineers would check the information acquired in this manner as well as that gleaned during the after-hours drinking sessions with other workers and subsequently with the study coordinators. 23
3 Impact of the Technical Study
Next, I shall describe what the Brazilian engineers learned through the technical study described in the above section. The direct objective of the technical study was the acquisition of skills in the Brazilian engineers’ field of specialization (the section in which they are slated to be posted); upon the Brazilian engineer’s return to their home country from Japan, the concerned parties in their home country should be able to observe an improvement in the skills of the engineers as compared with the original instructions imparted to the engineers. 24 However, at the same time this is not all the education that the Brazilian engineers gained from the program.
According to research conducted on the former trainees of the International Labor Office (ILO) Association of Japan’s International Technical Skill Plan training (based on the Institute of Economic Planning for Peace, which is currently known as the Economic Policy Institute for Quality Life), the training in Japan was not only effective in terms of the enhancement of specialized techniques and skills but also yielded additional indirect impact, namely, quality awareness, quality control activities, safety measures, on-site discipline, etc. 25 With regard to this issue, Yabunaka Yoshio of the business headquarters of Kobe Steel’s Machinery and Engineering commented, “Technical study/training is like television while dispatch of experts is like radio.”
“Trainees that come to Japan observe a great number of things, and in the process, they come to understand just how efficiently our plants operate, and since this is the case, the training really yields excellent results and is quite a convincing means of instruction. They are quite taken aback with how clean and orderly our facilities are, and showing them this is the most effective way to make them understand. 26 Visiting our production facilities is a powerful way of giving them a sense of the high technical and managerial standards of the Japanese manufacturing industry.”
The next section describes the nature of technical training when the operations at Usiminas were launched—a period that marked the beginning of technical cooperation. Upon completion of the technical study, an engineer from the C Group (A first-generation Japanese-Brazilian who joined Usiminas as an engineer for the Brazilian design section in December 1958. He was 37 years old at the time of the study and was assigned to the Planning Section of the Construction Bureau.) 27 described his study in Japan as follows:
“My impression of the Yawata Steelworks was that internal standards were thorough, including on such issues as orderliness and organization, respect for human life, safety issues, and so on. I was also very interested to see that even the older machinery was running at full capacity, and how what was lacking in facilities was made up for by the extensive experience, effort, planning, and steady improvements made by the plant workers, which I could see was the reason they were able to uphold today’s production standards. This was also a very interesting contrast with the newer facilities at the plant. It was in this regard that I really got a sense of the level of effort put forth by the Japanese and their sincere approach to their work. In this atmosphere, I couldn’t help but be touched by their enthusiasm, apparent in the extremely dense knowledge of the engineers, and in their ability to develop cutting-edge technology through steady effort. I am sure this enthusiasm is the reason why they continue to surpass world standards.” 28
We can surmise from the above that observing the technological and operational standards at Yawata Steelworks (i.e., awareness on the issues of on-site discipline, safety measures, equipment maintenance, and so on) had an immediate indirect impact. He was also able to reascertain the value of the Japanese steel industry as a worthy model. It can be surmised that this realization made the study of operations appear even more valuable and reliable, which in turn encouraged the Brazilian engineers to strive for success.
On the other hand, according to research conducted by the abovementioned Conference for Peacetime Economic Planning, in addition to labor-management relations, the fields for which it is difficult to observe results are personnel relocation, linking on-site and management personnel, and effective interaction between departments. 29 In this case, “effective interaction between departments” can be described in terms of mutual assistance between employees from different departments.
If it is difficult to achieve results in the two areas of “linking on-site and management personnel” and “effective interaction between departments.” In that case, observing results in terms of communication between the departments will also be difficult. Communication between departments is considered to be an important aspect of integrated quality control of the Japanese steel industry; therefore, the objective was not only to satisfy our customers by providing them with technical training but also to “open their eyes” to the possibilities.
By the phrase “opening their eyes,” I imply abandoning sectionalism, understanding one’s position in the context of the entire organization, enhancing communication between the employees involved in the various processing phases, and imparting an understanding of the importance of integrated quality control. In Japan, weekly meetings are held between the personnel involved in upstream and downstream processes; these provide an opportunity for communication. However, this practice does not appear to be prevalent abroad, even at present. The importance of this communication was strongly emphasized during training, and the Brazilian engineers were able to gain an understanding of this along with the work related to their individual areas of specialization. 30 This was our objective in observing the preliminary and refining phases on a weekly basis in the Brazilian engineer’s particular field of specialization. I believe that the engineers consequently gained an understanding of integrated quality control.
4 Summary
The following is a summary of this chapter. First, approximately 20 manager-class employees from Brazil participated in the technical study in Japan during the construction of Usiminas. Details are available with regard to 13 of these individuals who studied for approximately one year during the first half of the construction phase (1958–65). The technical study and training in Japan consisted only of engineers because issues related to foreign currency and fund procurement caused delays in the construction phase which in turn delayed recruitment. Therefore, time constraints prevented them from being dispatched to Japan for the training.
Second, the Japanese side, including the study coordinators, conducted the training purely based on the “show-how” format in which the Brazilian engineers observe the demonstration. Following the training imparted in various departments of the steelworks, specialized training including training in the upstream and downstream processes was conducted on site and at the sub-centers. In this case, the training was imparted mainly by regular daytime engineers on themes selected on an impromptu basis. In addition, Brazilian engineers were able to gain further insight into the issues through self-study by freely observing operations and communicating with equipment workers. There was no prearranged curriculum or text (curriculum comprised an outline with which pre-existing engineering documentation was used), and since the study coordinators were not full-time instructors and instruction had to be accommodated into the work schedule, technical study and training was not institutionalized.
Third, in addition to the direct impact of the acquisition of specialized technical knowledge, the training also had an indirect impact. As a result of on-site training in Japan, Brazilian engineers were able to reascertain the model presented by the Japanese steel industry and gain a clear understanding of its value. Further, the Brazilian engineers observed preliminary and refining processes based on their area of specialization on a weekly basis, and this enabled them to acquire knowledge regarding communication among sections, which is generally difficult to achieve in technical study and training programs.
III Technical Assistance Personnel Dispatched from Japan
In this chapter, before providing an overview of the training methods and format in Brazil, I describe the type and number of personnel and responsibilities of the group of technical assistance personnel dispatched from Japan to Brazil.
1 Type and Number of Personnel Dispatched from Japan
The personnel sent from Japan can be classified into those providing technical assistance with reference to the following: construction, setup, and operations. As noted above, these three groups, which belong to the category of guidance and education/training, are part of the construction and the preparation phases for the launch of operations. This training was carried out with a total of 137 employees from 34 Japanese equipment suppliers on a scale of 1,508 man-months. 31 Although purchases at Usiminas were primarily from Japan, converter vessels and the bodies of hot strip mills were procured from European manufacturers. 32 It can be surmised that the European equipment providers were involved in the setting up of equipment provided; however, the number of setup personnel dispatched and the scale of setup operations in general is vaguely described in sources of written materials. 33
As soon as the personnel from the Japanese steel companies who were in charge of providing technical assistance with reference to construction and operational training (Yawata Iron & Steel, Fuji Iron & Steel, and NKK) were designated as Usiminas employees, they were dispatched to Usiminas on leave of absence. 34 During the approximately 8-month period that spanned from the dispatch of the first civil engineers in May 1958 to the end of the technical training in October 1966, approximately 500 individuals were dispatched via Nippon Usiminas. 35 In addition to these three companies, Kajima Corporation, which also provided technical assistance on construction issues, directly contracted with Usiminas (instead of passing through Nippon Usiminas), and dispatched a total of 11 people (460 man-months) to the local construction bureau. 36
As discussed in a previous paper, recruitment of employees and educational/training programs, which belong to the preparation phase the launch of operations, began locally on a full scale after April 1961. Considering that the first large group of technical assistance personnel arrived between April and June, it can be said that the full-scale dispatch of technical assistance staff began during this time. 37 The number of staff dispatched from Japan reached peak levels between May and July 1962 (244 personnel) 38 and immediately before the completion of the coke furnace and blast furnaces Nos. 1 and 2.
In particular, I have focused on the percentage of dispatched personnel that were engaged in providing technical assistance pertaining to construction and operation. According to Table 1, the activities of the personnel with the Technical and Operations Department at the Headquarters (486 + 1,426 man-months or 17% of a total of 11,257 man-months including that of Kajima Corporation) can be viewed as management cooperation and participation rather than technical cooperation with a component of operational assistance.
On the other hand, I can infer that individuals dispatched to the Construction Bureau (813 man-months and 460 man-months for employees dispatched by Kajima to provide technical assistance regarding construction or 11.3% of the total) were engaged in providing technical assistance with reference to construction. However, at the same time, it can be said that personnel engaged in providing technical assistance with reference to operations can also provide assistance pertaining to construction and setup. These individuals, mainly comprising operations personnel from departments other than the Headquarters of the Technical and Administration Department and the Construction Bureau (8,072 man-months, 71.1%), were also engaged in providing assistance with reference to construction and setup.
The percentage of dispatched employees who were secondarily engaged in the provision of technical assistance pertaining to construction and setup is unclear. However, on the other hand, the provision of technical assistance regarding operations occupied the biggest share in areas in which “technology transfer by people” was most important, i.e., technical assistance and employee education/training (assistance in construction, setup, and operations). In the following paragraphs, I will focus on technical assistance pertaining to operations and the duties of the personnel engaged in it.
2 Responsibilities of the Dispatched Personnel
The major duties of the dispatched operational personnel were as follows. 39
(a) Provide recommendations related to construction and civil engineering.
(b) Provide proposals on operational standards, operational procedures, maintenance standards, and so on.
(c) Plan production and provide specifications, process management, employee planning, planning the launch of an equipment, and production-related planning.
(d) Procure operational materials, spare parts, and other industrial equipment.
(e) Provide training and education to the Brazilian employees.
(f) Supervise and implement operations as production line department supervisors.
Table 1: Technical Cooperation (Man-Months) at Usiminas
Dept. Manager |
Div. Manager |
Section Manager |
Assistant Section Manager |
Technical Specialist |
Total |
|||||
Construction Bureau |
105 |
116 |
300 |
4 |
288 |
813 |
||||
Administration Dept. |
Dept. |
46 |
46 |
|||||||
Production Control Div. |
57 |
216 |
46 |
195 |
514 |
|||||
Technical Control Div. |
69 |
128 |
51 |
288 |
536 |
|||||
Inspection Div. |
38 |
187 |
225 |
|||||||
IE Div. |
43 |
62 |
105 |
|||||||
Total |
46 |
126 |
425 |
159 |
670 |
1,426 |
||||
Ironmaking Dept. |
Dept. |
48 |
9 |
44 |
15 |
116 |
||||
Raw Materials Processing Div. |
34 |
44 |
56 |
153 |
287 |
|||||
Ironmaking Div. |
29 |
81 |
107 |
392 |
609 |
|||||
Coke Div. |
Coke Section Chemical Conversion Section |
14 38 52 |
43 115 158 |
99 99 |
475 178 653 |
631 331 962 |
||||
Total |
48 |
124 |
327 |
277 |
1,198 |
1,974 |
||||
Steelmaking Dept. |
Dept. |
58 |
2 |
57 |
117 |
|||||
Steelmaking Div. |
38 |
110 |
589 |
737 |
||||||
Refractory Lining Div. |
31 |
38 |
156 |
225 |
||||||
Total |
58 |
71 |
205 |
0 |
745 |
1,079 |
||||
Rolling Mill Dept. |
Slab Div. |
34 |
76 |
248 |
358 |
|||||
Plate (Hot-rolling) Div. |
38 |
74 |
404 |
516 |
||||||
Cold Rolling Div. |
37 |
25 |
39 |
251 |
352 |
|||||
Rolling Technology Div. |
37 |
49 |
26 |
128 |
240 |
|||||
Dept. and Technical Staff |
37 |
97 |
134 |
|||||||
Total |
37 |
146 |
224 |
65 |
1,128 |
1,600 |
||||
Engineering Service Dept. |
Engineering Service |
Dept. |
55 |
56 |
111 |
|||||
Design Div. |
Electrical Sec. Machinery Sec. Total |
51 51 |
62 62 124 |
39 27 66 |
152 89 241 |
|||||
Power Div. |
63 |
191 |
31 |
414 |
699 |
|||||
Machining Div. |
Machining Sec. Casting & Forging Sec. Total |
55 55 |
180 38 218 |
334 227 561 |
569 265 834 |
|||||
Total |
55 |
169 |
589 |
97 |
975 |
1,885 |
||||
Maintenance |
Electrical Maintenance Div. |
69 |
186 |
37 |
643 |
935 |
||||
Engineering Equipment Div. |
65 |
153 |
74 |
273 |
565 |
|||||
Total |
0 |
134 |
339 |
111 |
916 |
1,500 |
||||
Transport Technology Staff |
0 |
20 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
34 |
||||
Total |
349 |
906 |
2,409 |
727 |
5,920 |
10,311 |
||||
Head Office Technical Section |
83 |
186 |
217 |
0 |
0 |
486 |
||||
Total |
432 |
1,092 |
2,626 |
727 |
5,920 |
10,797 |
||||
Note 1: “Assistant Section Manager” in the table refers to a personnel member who assists the section manager, while “Technical Specialist” refers to a foreman-level employee.
Note 2: For the purpose of convenience, the table includes individuals affiliated with the Technical and Iron Production Control Departments of the Headquarters, who are technically a part of the management aspect of providing technical assistance.
Source: Nippon Usiminas, Appendix p.51.
The responsibilities of these dispatched personnel span the entire preparation phase for the operations, and as noted in (f), technical personnel dispatched from Japan are directly responsible for production operations and are also directly engaged in operations. In other words, personnel dispatched from Japan were the first production line (for a duration of approximately one year following the launch of trial operations) 40 and operations supervisors engaged in steel production. 41 With regard to the organizational aspect of steel production, the Japanese unit, in charge of the Coordination, Administration, Ironmaking, and Steel Products Departments (later organized into the Steelmaking and Rolling Mill Departments), dispatched a department manager, division manager, section manager, and foremen. The Brazilian personnel who studied in Japan were assigned to work with these individuals in the positions of assistant department managers, assistant division managers, and assistant section managers. 42 Manager-class and general employee positions were mainly occupied by Brazilians, while technical experts were paired with Brazilian middle-rank employees in supervisory positions.
Subsequently, I shall address the question regarding whether personnel dispatched from Japan (providing technical assistance regarding operations), who were directly responsible for the production process, were dispatched due to capital participation in Nippon Usiminas. In general, the role of a company that is not engaged in capital participation, where facilities are not available, is limited to that of consultants engaged in providing technical assistance. All production-related posts are occupied by the receiving end, and advice is dispensed to personnel in key positions.
In the case of companies that were not engaged in capital participation, e.g., Pohang Iron & Steel (South Korea) and Baoshan Iron & Steel (China), the local unit took the initiative for operations prior to construction and the Japanese unit took up the role of an advisor. However, in reality, due to various difficulties including breakdowns, the employees dispatched from Japan joined the production line. This type of supervision was required to ensure the smooth transition to operations. As a result, regardless of their involvement in capital participation, technical assistance and equipment supplier personnel assumed the responsibility for operations in the initial stages, and there was no other option but to dispatch operational supervisors. 43
Another question is regarding the reason that the equipment provider does not take responsibility for operations, i.e., he/she does not dispatch technical assistance personnel, when the equipment often experiences breakdowns or problems are continuously incurred. The reason, which I touched upon in a previous paper, is that the large-scale steel plant is a multi-faceted, integrated facility comprising a number of plants, facilities, equipments, and machineries, and it is engaged in a number of production processes in a variety of industrial sectors including machinery, chemistry, and power.
The skills required for this type of large-scale steelworks are categorized as “operational skills” by Jiro Takagi. “Operational skills” refer to operations of the production process including conversion, conveyance, and storage typically observed in the process industry, i.e., the running and operation of machinery and equipment. Since the type of massive equipment used on site cannot be brought into a classroom, these skills are extremely difficult to acquire in a setting external to the plant. 44 Finally, there was no other option than that of carrying out the learning process using on-site machinery; however, the difficulty in this case was that it may result in a machinery breakdown or other problems. In order to avoid such a situation, the equipment provider should be directly responsibly for the production process and should be actively engaged in operations in the initial phases.
3 Summary
The following is a summary of the information presented in this chapter. The first point that was covered stated that amongst the technical assistance and education/training aspects (construction, setup, and operations) of the Usiminas Construction Project, in which “technology transfer by people” is most relevant, operations accounted for the largest category. Of a total of 77% (or 8,072 man-months) of personnel dispatches between Nippon Usiminas and Kajima Corporation, the provision of technical assistance in operations accounted for the largest share. Technical assistance pertaining to operations was mainly carried out over 5 years from 1961–66.
Second, it is almost impossible to acquire the skills required for the operation of a large-scale steelworks like Usiminas (operational skills) in a classroom setting that is devoid of equipment. Therefore, the only option that ultimately remains is the utilization of the equipment employed on site for learning purposes. However, in such cases, it is critical to avoid damage to the machinery and/or any operational problems that may result from this type of training program. Therefore, the assigned operational staff is dispatched from Japan for all aspects of the preparation for the launch of operations, such that they are directly responsible for production activities and directly engaged in operations. This is a critical factor. Conversely, this is viewed as an opportunity for the personnel dispatched from Japan to “show (the Brazilian) how”; in other words, the technical assistance personnel working in operations “lead by example,” i.e., “Sossen Suihan.”
IV Technical Assistance Pertaining to Operations, Education, and Training in Brazil
In this chapter, I explore the manner in which the Japanese technical assistance personnel assigned to the production line dealt with the problems encountered in providing technical assistance pertaining to operations as well as education and training.
1 Difficulties Encountered in Providing Technical Assistance Regarding Operations and Education/Training
As clarified in a previous paper, the various phases of a project may overlap; however, at the same time, the phases have their own context, which implies that the progress of the construction and procurement phases, etc., has a significant impact on the preparation phase for the launch of operations. This phase comprises the provision of technical assistance in operations as well as education and training. Problems resulting from the preparation phase for the launch of Usiminas Construction Project operations are initially due to delays in the procurement phase and then in the construction phase. In particular, problems at the procurement stage including the misplacement of important components purchased from Japan; inflation that caused delays in the local procurement of materials (i.e., electrical wiring, steel pipes, lead pipes, rail, etc.); delay in the arrival and/or misplacement of drafts of equipment manufactures; and decline in the value of construction budgets due to inflation, resulting in delays in construction, 45 all resulted in delays in the construction phase (setup). Consequently, there were further delays in training, which proved to be an obstacle to the preparation phase for the launch of operations. The delays in the procurement and construction phases are referred to as delays in technology information transfer in the form of facilities (equipment, components, and materials) and technology information transfer in the form of documentation.
Second, there were also delays in the operations launch preparation phase itself, e.g., delays in the recruitment and placement of technical staff and general employees, delays in the translation of engineering documentation obtained from Japan, which in turn caused further delays in personnel training. 46
“The personnel division managers, section managers, dispatched from Japan quickly took to the task of making up documents in procedures, technical standards, etc., and translating them into Portuguese for use as a textbook, enlisting the assistance of the ‘Sete Samurais’ and the technical experts, also sent from Japan, utilizing the user manuals of the equipment to be installed in the plant, technical reference material brought from Japan, etc. Despite their efforts, the materials were not completed until a considerable amount of time had passed after the launch of operations. Because there were no capable interpreters or translators available, a long period of time was required to complete a set of standard materials, and the task was only finally completed after several months had passed since the launch of operations with the assistance of a qualified translator.” 47 Due to the fact that personnel training and preparation for the launch of operations had to be carried out prior to the launch without the appropriate materials detailing procedures and technical standards, significant difficulties and extensive delays were incurred in technology information transfer in the form of documentation.
Next, I shall discuss the type of training that was held amidst these difficult circumstances. In principle, the training for middle-rank employees was intended to be carried out by the division and section manager dispatched from Japan and the group of individuals who had studied in Japan, while the training for general employees was supposed to be conducted by a group of technical experts (foremen) from Japan and middle-rank employees. 48 However, in reality, the group worked on the training as one coherent team. “It was lead by a division manager, who was assisted by Brazilian engineers, technicians, and operators as well as employees of Japanese descent who acted as interpreters. The training was conducted with both classroom lectures and working with models on both day and night shifts with parallel themes involving improvised translation of materials and other education/training sessions.” 49
Prior to the transfer of the relevant facilities to Usiminas, the setup personnel dispatched from the provider of the facilities provided training on machinery operations, upon request. Prior to the production of steel ingots, when no materials were available for use, training was conducted by using pieces of wood in place of steel. 50
I shall examine this aspect in the context of a plate mill. Training in plating was launched on the arrival of a division manager from Japan in the field of plating in July 1961 for two assistant division manager-level specialists in plating (A4 and A5). One year later, with the addition of 2 engineers, 6 technicians, and 3 administrative employees, the scale of training in plating increased to a total of 14 participants. With the exception of the two original assistant division managers, none of them had any such experience in rolling mills. Therefore, starting with an overview of the plant, the text was translated from Japanese to English, which was then translated into Portuguese by the assistant division managers.
Later, the administration was assigned to two Japanese-Brazilians who were able to translate from Japanese to Portuguese. Then, the two section managers dispatched from Japan penned training materials, which were translated into Portuguese by the Japanese Brazilians and were later used by the assistant division managers for the training sessions. Although this division of labor was very successful, there were only six months remaining for the launch of operations, and the personnel had to be trained in a limited period of time with reference to the operation of rolling mills of which they had no prior knowledge. The operations included difficult topics such as metallurgy, plating production methods, and quality control. Therefore, to achieve the goals of the program, the trainees were given tests every two weeks as part of a rigid training system designed to encourage them to “push themselves to the limit.” As a result of their unflagging diligence, they were able to achieve a standard on par with that of the Japanese. 51
Both the classroom and on-site trainings were conducted harmoniously engaging the entire equipment in a fast-paced conveyor-belt system designed to make the trainees work as hard as they could. In this case, the role of the group who had studied in Japan was to enhance the understanding of and gain the support of the Japanese. 52
2 Education and Training of Division Manager and Section Manager Class Employees and Transfer of Control
During the construction of Usiminas, training was conducted in different formats for high-rank, middle-rank, and general employees. 53 As noted above, only high-ranking employees were trained in Japan wherein many of them were division or section managers. In the following section, I will discuss the training imparted to these individuals as well as the issue of transfer of control.
As discussed above, the training system was organized such that the Brazilian assistant division managers and assistant section managers were paired with the division and section managers dispatched from Japan. Moreover, the division managers were responsible for the training of the assistant division managers, and likewise, the section managers were responsible for the assistant section managers. Thus, in this way, the personnel from Japan and their respective assistants addressed the same issues and problems, such as how to draw up report forms for process directives; the procedure for drying the furnace and how and by when to procure the necessary materials; how and when to hire workmen; how to plan training for the workers, etc., and worked together to solve them. 54 K, who was dispatched to Brazil at the time in the capacity of section manager for the blooming mill processing, describes the extent of the cooperation. He narrates that a local recruit, who was a university graduate, was paired with him and accompanied him the entire day for all types of activities, such as taking lunch breaks, attending meetings, or touring the warehouse. 55 Each of the technical assistance personnel were in charge of training one local staffer assigned to them (e.g., one section manager was paired with one assistant section manager, etc.).56
The training period for the assistant section managers was originally the same—three years—as that for which the section managers were dispatched to Japan; however, the period was reduced to approximately two years due to funding problems and delays in the recruitment process that were a result of a lack of interested parties due to geographical conditions. 57 Although the negative impact of the training period was reduced, the division manager and section manager class training was carried out on a one-to-one basis and the assistant division/section managers (Brazilians) even accompanied the division/section managers (Japanese) during their breaks and lunch hours. This enabled the Brazilians to actually observe all the different procedures as they were being carried out, and this intense OJT was continuously conducted for two complete years. 58
However, the training personnel had to return to Japan within the original period of time (four years, except for technical specialists in whose case the time period was reduced to three years as of 1964), 59 which implied that the responsibility of production management had to be transferred to the Brazilians at an early stage. In reality, when the deadline for the responsibility of the Japanese for the launch of operations, production equipment maintenance, and labor management was approaching, the Brazilian engineers were also gaining confidence in their abilities; hence, they requested that control be transferred to them. 60
In addition, the long-term personnel dispatch plan of March 1963 entailed the following on the presumption that responsibility of the control of operations would be transferred to the Brazilians. First, the number of dispatched personnel would be reduced as far as possible, and at the same time, efficiency would be raised to a maximum. Second, the control of the production line would be transferred to the Brazilian unit at the earliest as soon as it was determined that they could handle the operations. Third, following the transfer of control, the dispatched personnel would be engaged in offering guidance and recommendations as staff. In accordance with this plan, transfer began with the division of the Ironmaking Department (October 1, 1963), which was launched earlier, subsequently followed by the individual transfer of other divisions and departments until the transfer of the cold strip mill (cold strip division, rolling department) was completed a year later. Thus, responsibility for all production lines had been transferred to the Brazilians as of October 1966.
The time of the transfer of control determines the success or failure of technology transfer. As soon as it was determined that operations could be launched realistically, the control was transferred from the Japanese to the Brazilian unit very quickly; in this case, the real issue is regarding the basis on which the decision was made. In order to analyze this issue, we will look at the Department whose control was primarily transferred—the Ironmaking Department.
According to the then Manager of the Ironmaking Department, all the dispatched employees, except the department manager class personnel, were decisively withdrawn from the production line and replaced by Brazilian engineers in October 1963. Apart from the technical issues, there were some complications with this arrangement. The balance of rights and responsibilities was far stricter than that in Japan due to the absence of a lifetime employment system. As a result of these conditions, it was determined that it was impossible to provide serious technical training to staff. Based on this decision, the control was transferred to the Brazilian engineers, and their performance exceeded the expectations. One of the then subordinates (Japanese study team B1), who went on to become the Vice President of Usiminas, later expressed his appreciation for handing over control of the line to the Brazilian engineers before that of the other departments. Based on this, we can ascertain that the decision, in terms of the end results, was indeed a wise one. 61
At the same time, the section manager in charge of the blooming process of the metal rolling department was taken off the line and given the position of a staff member, while the Brazilian assistant section manager was promoted. 62 According to K, it was not that the control was transferred at the most appropriate time but rather it can be interpreted that the schedule for the return of the technical assistance personnel to Japan had already been determined and the transfer was carried out automatically in accordance with this. K further states, “We were actually really worried about whether it would really be okay, whether we could really have them take charge of everything.” 63 Considering this statement along with other information, the viewpoint of the Japanese personnel dispatched to Brazil can be surmised as follows: “Though we felt there would be reason for concern, there was no other option but to go ahead and decisively transfer control to the Brazilian side, since the deadlines for both the transfer and our return home was approaching. Once we went ahead with it, however, we found that it went surprisingly well.”
3 Summary
This chapter can be summarized as follows. First, the Japanese technical assistance personnel experienced problems in the launch preparation phase (delays in recruitment, translation, and so on), the procurement phase (materials not arriving, etc.), and the construction phase (delays, etc.). As a result of these problems, the training in a classroom setting and on site was implemented in a conveyor belt style system where the participants were forced to acquire skills at an accelerated rate. Amidst this environment, the group of employees who had trained in Japan had to facilitate understanding of and cooperation with the Japanese technical assistance workers in the Brazilian unit. Second, the education and training provided mainly for division and section managers was organized in such a manner that one Japanese technical assistance worker was assigned to one assistant, i.e. Japanese division managers and section managers were paired with Brazilian assistant division managers and section managers, respectively. The format consisted of a one-to-one OJT in which the pairs of personnel attended to the various aspects of production; in this way, the Brazilians were “shown how” to execute all the procedures, and this intense training lasted for two years. Third, the transfer of control from the Japanese to the Brazilian unit was a decisive action taken in light of the schedule of the return of the technical assistance workers to Japan, which had been determined in advance, rather than a result of concluding that the Brazilians had the appropriate technical capacity. Thus, the transfer eventually became a partly mechanical endeavor. However, despite the concerns of the Japanese unit, the transfer was essentially a success, and the Japanese concluded that “things went unexpectedly well once we went ahead and did it.”
V Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to show how the provision of assistance in operations and technical study and training for the Usiminas project had to be mainly carried out on site by adopting the “show how” format.
Because technical study and training had not been instituted in Japan, it was conducted on site at the plant using a “show how” format. Moreover, the training was conducted on a discretionary basis, both on the part of the plant personnel and the Brazilian engineers in such a manner that it was often improvisational, incorporating a large component of self-study in which the participants observed the operations. In this case, the participants assumed the position solely of observers, while the Japanese only demonstrated the technique. In addition to the direct effect of “being shown how” on site, there were also important indirect effects, such as, the participants were able to view the Japanese steel industry as a model of their efforts.
As illustrated by the fact that the Japanese technical assistance personnel who were dispatched to offer assistance in operations and training were responsible for the production lines and actual operations, their stance consisted of “showing (the Brazilians) how” that is, “Sossen Suihan”—“leadership by example.” This was done in order to avoid problems associated with acquiring the necessary skills (“operational skills”) to operate a large-scale steelworks. The individuals who had received training in Japan were assigned to the Japanese division and section managers as assistants. At this stage, the training progressed to a level at which the participants “observed the procedure and at the same time attempted to execute the procedures themselves” and the Japanese personnel “showed the Brazilians the technique and also got them to execute the work hands-on.”
As part of the training formats “show (the Brazilians) how” and “lead by example,” the Japanese technical assistance personnel were responsible for the production lines and the actual operations. This situation led to the issue of transfer of control. The decision regarding when the control should be transferred depended more on the time constraints than a determination of the appropriate timing with regard to the technical capacity of the Brazilians. In other words, there was no other choice but to carry out the transfer in a mechanized manner. Despite the concerns of the Japanese unit, the move was essentially considered a success. From the Brazilian perspective, this was a shift from participatory observation to executing the work in reality, while from the Japanese perspective, following the transfer of control, their position changed to that of observers. This implies that at this point, the program had evolved from a situation where one side was “showing” and the other “observing.” This process necessarily involved decisions on the Japanese unit, while with regard to the Brazilian unit, the fact that they had actually taken charge of the work was the beginning of their success in the venture.
Moreover, the operational and technical assistance provided for the Usiminas project, which mainly focused on the “show how” format, involved a conversion of both the technical assistance (Japanese) side and the receiving end of the assistance (the Brazilian side). In other words, the individuals trained in Japan were initially only observers during their stay in Japan, following which they became participatory observers during their training in Brazil prior to the transfer of control, and eventually took charge (pure doer) after the transfer of control. The Japanese side, on the other hand, acted purely as the demonstrating side (pure doer) during the training in Japan, while in Brazil they observed as they demonstrated, and subsequent to the transfer of control, they took the position of pure observers. Thus, it can be said that “technology transfer by people” was implemented in this manner.
This work was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (Grant-in-Aid for Encouragement of Young Scientists: No.12780004).
References
“Gijutsu Kenshusei ni 3-mei no Haken Kimaru [Dispatch of Three Engineers].” Ipatinga Jiho, 2, July 15, 1960, p.13 (in Japanese).
Hasegawa, Shin. “Technology Transfer by Japanese Steel Industry to Usiminas, Brazil.” The Shogaku Ronshu: the Business Review of Kansai University, 47(1), 2002, pp.85–118 (in Japanese).
Hayashi, Takabumi. “Technology Accumulation and Japanese-Style Technology Transfer Systems,” Takabumi Hayashi and Chen Bingfu eds., Technological Development in Asia and Technology Transfer, Bunshindo, 1995, 47–73) (in Japanese).
History of Kajima Corporation Compilation Committee. Kajima Kensetsu Hyakusanjunen-shi [Kajima Corporation: 130 Years of History] (I), 1971 (in Japanese).
“Hot-Strip Mill no Shiatsuen wo Mukaete [Working Toward Trial Run for Hot-Strip Mills],” Ipatinga Jiho, 48, September 30, 1965 (in Japanese).
Institute of Economic Planning for Peace. Training for the People of the Asia-Pacific Countries and Technology/Skills Transfer, The Economic Research Institute (ERI) and Japan Society for the Promotion of Machine Industry (JSPMI), 1990 (in Japanese).
“Intendente Câmara Seitetsujo Jinji Hatsurei [Intendente Câmara Steelworks: announce personnel changes]” (2), Ipatinga Jiho, 17, October 10, 1961, p.1 (in Japanese).
Kashibuchi, Takashi. “Tojoukoku ga Nozomu Gijutsu Iten [Technology Transfer That Developing Countries Want].” Jirei Kenkyuu: Tojoukoku heno Gijutstu Iten de Chuui subeki Mondai-ten Kousatsu [Case Studies: Critical Issues in Technology Transfer to Developing Countries], Nihon Brain, 1985, pp.16–32 (in Japanese).
Kobayashi, Kenji. “Tekkogyo: Usiminas no Rei [The Steel Industry: A Study of Usiminas].” Ohashi Masahiro ed., Kaigai Shokugyo Kunren Handbook: Brazil [Overseas Job Training Handbook: Brazil], Overseas Vocational Training Association (OVTA), 1997, pp.124–148 (in Japanese).
Mello, Mauricio de. “A Organização.” Usiminas, Usiminas Conta Sua História (Depoimentos), 1990 (in Portuguese).
Nakagawa, Yasuzo. Usiminas Monogatari [The Story of Usiminas], The Sanno Institute of Management Junior College Publishing Division, 1974, p.220 (in Japanese).
Nakamura, Naoto. “Koro Monogatari; Sekai wo Shiyani [A Blast Furnace Story: Taking a World View],” Kinzoku [Metals & Technology], 67(8), 1998, pp.82–83 (in Japanese).
Nakamura, Naoto. “Koro Monogatari Yoroku; Brazil to Watashi [Excerpts from a Blast Furnace Story: Brazil and Me]” (2) Kinzoku [Metals & Technology], 68(9), 1998, pp.90–91 (in Japanese).
Nakamura, Naoto. “Koro Monogatari Yoroku; Brazil to Watashi [Excerpts from a Blast Furnace Story]” (5), Kinzoku [Metals & Technology], 68(12), 1998, pp.90–91 (in Japanese).
Nippon Usiminas. Junen-shi [Ten Years of History], 1969, 274, p.69 (in Japanese).
Okamura, Yoshitaka. “Atsuita-kojo deno Akekure [Day and Night at the Heavy Plate Plant],” Ipatinga Jiho, No. 27, August 10, 1962, p.3 (in Japanese).
Overseas Vocational Training Association ed. “Kaigaihaken Keikensha Zadankai [Roundtable Discussion by Experts Dispatched Abroad],” The Overseas Vocation Training Association: 10 Years of History, 1992 (in Japanese).
“Ri-chakunin sha [Left and Arrived]” Ipatinga Jiho, 10, November 1964, p.11 (in Japanese).
“Seitetsujo Sosiki no Kaisei [Reorganization of the Steelworks]” Ipatinga Jiho, 10, November 1964, p.9 (in Japanese).
“Showa 35-36 Nendo no Zainichi Kenshuin no Ukeire [Japan-Based Training, Fiscal 1960–61].” Tekko Nenkan [Steel Almanac], 1962 Edition, Tekko Shimbunsha, 1962 (in Japanese).
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Footnotes
1 I would like to thank Mr. K, formerly with the Technical Cooperation Division of Nippon Steel Corporation (NSC), who amiably assisted me with the oral research required to complete this paper as well as Mr. U, secretary-general of the Nippon Usiminas, who provided me with invaluable materials required for the work. This paper is based on oral research conduced with Mr. K from November 2001 to July 2002. Although Mr. K graciously assisted in checking the facts of the draft of this paper, as the writer, I accept full responsibility for the contents contained herein.
2 The name of the company is Usinas Siderúrgicas de Minas Gerais S.A., while the name of the steelworks is Usina Intendente Camara. Since it is the only steelworks located in Usiminas, the plant is hereafter referred to as “Usiminas.”
3 Hasegawa, Shin. “Technology Transfer by the Japanese Steel Industry to Usiminas, Brazil.” The Shogaku Ronshu: the Business Review of Kansai University, 47(1), 2002, pp.85–118.
4 As noted in my previous paper, Takabumi Hayashi classified technology transfer into the following three categories: First, transfer in the form of documents (patents, blueprints, process drawings, manuals, etc.); second, transfer in the form of facilities such as machinery and industrial tools; and third, transfer via people and organizations (dispatch of Japanese technical experts to local areas and of local employees to Japan for technical training). (Hayashi, Takabumi. “Technology Accumulation and Japanese-Style Technology Transfer Systems,” Takabumi Hayashi and Chen Bingfu eds., Technological Development in Asia and Technology Transfer, Bunshindo, 1995, pp.47–73).
5 As mentioned in my previous paper, the role of people of Japanese descent in the Usiminas Construction Project is an important parallel theme. Therefore, I would like to discuss it in a separate paper.
6 Nippon Usiminas. Junen-shi [Ten Years of History], 1969, Appendix, pp.3–8.
7 One of these individuals, Mauricio de Mello, referred to these seven engineers as the “Seven Samurais” (“Sete Samurais”). The term should more accurately be understood as a general reference to engineers who were sent to Japan when the Usiminas Project was launched, since different people involved in the project gave the seven engineers different names. (Mello, Mauricio de. “A Organização.” Usiminas, Usiminas Conta Sua História (Depoimentos), 1990, p.9 and K, June 24, 2002).
8 Mello, p.9, Nippon Usiminas, Appendix, pp.3–8.
9 “Gijutsu Kenshusei ni 3-mei no Haken Kimaru [Dispatch of Three Engineers].” Ipatinga Jiho, 2, July 15, 1960, p.13. “Showa 35-36 Nendo no Zainichi Kenshuin no Ukeire [Japan-Based Training, Fiscal 1960–61].” Tekko Nenkan [Steel Almanac], 1962 Edition, Tekko Shimbunsha, 1962, p.168, Table 12.
10 K, February 19, 2002.
11 CCT was a Tokyo-based organization that facilitated steel plant construction facility projects and machinery/facility purchases from Japan, the U.S., and Europe (Nippon Usiminas, Section II, pp.203–204).
12 Mello, pp.8–9, K, January 28, 2002. “Showa 35–36 Nendo no Zainichi Kenshuin no Ukeire [Japan-Based Training, Fiscal 1960–61].” p.168, Table 12.
13 K, January 28, 2002. Yuasa, Izumi. “Yawata Seitetsu no Kenshu wo Oete [Training at Nippon Steel Yawata Works Completed],” Ipatinga Jiho, 22, March 10, 1962, p.3.
14 Hasegawa, p.111 and Figure 4.
15 Kashibuchi, Takashi. “Tojoukoku ga Nozomu Gijutsu Iten [Technology Transfer that Developing Countries Want].” Jirei Kenkyuu: Tojoukoku heno Gijutsu Iten de Chuisubeki Mondai-ten Kousatsu [Case Studies: Critical Issues in Technology Transfer to Developing Countries], Nihon Brain, 1985, p.22.
16 Kobayashi, Kenji. “Tekkogyo: Usiminas no Rei [The Steel Industry: A Study of Usiminas].” Ohashi Masahiro ed., Kaigai Shokugyo Kunren Handbook: Brazil [Overseas Job Training Handbook: Brazil], Overseas Vocational Training Association (OVTA), 1997, pp.140–141.
17 K, December 17, 2001.
18 Mauricio de Mello, pp.8–9.
19 Yuasa, p.3.
20 K, June 24, 2002. Following the launch of the twin production centers of Yawata and Tobata at Nippon Steel Yawata Works in December 1964, the production control centers were established under the main office at Nippon Steel Yawata Works and sub-centers were set up under them (K, June 24, 2002).
21 Kobayashi, p.139.
22 K, December 17, 2001.
23 K, December 8, 2001 and December 17, 2001.
24 Kobayashi, p.139. Nakamura, Naoto. “Koro Monogatari Yoroku; Brazil to Watashi [Excerpts from a Blast Furnace Story]” (5), Kinzoku [Metals & Technology], 68(12), 1998, p.91. Mello, p.4.
25 Institute of Economic Planning for Peace. Training for the People of the Asia-Pacific Countries and Technology/Skills Transfer, The Economic Research Institute (ERI) and Japan Society for the Promotion of Machine Industry (JSPMI), 1990, p.12. Uchida, Ken. “Technology Transfer and the Technical Training System” Rodo Kenkyujoho [Labor Research Report], (The Tokyo Labor Research Institute) 11, 1990, p.70.
26 Overseas Vocational Training Association ed. “Kaigaihaken Keikensha Zadankai [Roundtable Discussion by Experts Dispatched Abroad],” The Overseas Vocation Training Association: 10 Years of History, 1992, p.93.
27 “Gijutsu Kenshuusei ni 3-mei no Haken Kimaru [Dispatch of Three Engineers],” p.13. “Usiminas Saiyo Nikkei Shokuin Shokai [Employees of Japanese Descent at Usiminas]” (1), Ipatinga Jiho, 16, September 10, 1961, p.4.
28 Yuasa, p.3.
29 The Institute of Economic Planning for Peace, p.12.
30 K, December 17, 2001.
31 Nippon Usiminas, p.262, Table 57.
32 Nippon Usinimas, p.251. According to the final facility-planning proposal of the late 1950s, the total expenditure on equipment/facilities procured from Japan amounted to 36.2 billion yen (approximately $100 million) as opposed to the purchases from Europe that amounted to $29.6 million (Nippon Usiminas, p.255). According to these figures, the share of purchases made from Japan exceeded 70%.
33 The hot strip mills at the hot-rolling facilities are an example of technical assistance in setup by European facility providers. The mills were provided by Sack of Germany, the electronic facilities were provided by Toshiba, and the technical assistance for the setup was provided by both. “Hot-Strip Mill no Shiatsuen wo Mukaete [Working Toward Trial Run for Hot-Strip Mills],” Ipatinga Jiho, 48, September 30, 1965.
34 Nippon Usiminas, p.107.
35 Nippon Usiminas, pp.105–108. “Usiminas Kensetsu ni Nihon no Jinteki Doryoku [Japanese Assistance via Personnel During the Construction of Usiminas],” Ipatinga Jiho, 52, November 30, 1966, p.2.
36 History of Kajima Corporation Compilation Committee. Kajima Kensetsu Hyakusanjunen-shi [Kajima Corporation: 130 Years of History] (I), 1971, pp.575–576. Nippon Usiminas, p.262.
37 The Usiminas Memoirs Editing Group, “Usiminas Shoshi [A Short History of Usiminas],” Usiminas Kaisoroku [The Usiminas Memoirs], 1997, p.27.
38 “Japanese Human Resource Cooperation on the Construction of Usiminas,” p.2.
39 The Usiminas Memoirs Editing Group, p.28.
40 The Usiminas Memoirs Editing Group, p.28.
41 This is considered to be the reason why the occupation of the operations category accounts for the largest share amongst the different types of work assigned to the technical assistance personnel.
42 Kobayashi, pp.136–137, The Usiminas Memoirs Editing Group, p.34. Assignments of the Japanese study personnel dispatched to Brazil are as follows.
A1 Assistant Division Manager, Coke Division,
A2 Assistant Division Manager, Raw Materials Processing Division,
A3 Assistant Division Manager, Steelmaking Division,
A4 and A5 Assistant Division Manager, Plate Division,
A6 Assistant Division Manager, Production Control Division,
B1 Assistant Division Manager, Ironmaking Division,
B2 Assistant Division Manager, Design Division,
C1 Assistant Division Manager, Refractory Lining Division,
C2 Assistant Division Manager, Technical Management Division,
C3 Assistant Division Manager, Slab Production Division.
Source: “Intendente Câmara Seitetsujo Jinji Hatsurei [Intendente Câmara Steelworks: announce personnel changes]” (2), Ipatinga Jiho, 17, October 10, 1961, p.1.
43 K, January 28 and February 25, 2002. In recent years, different types of facility supplier contracts, such as the turnkey contract, the BOT contract, etc., have been developed, which are useful in clearly determining the parties that are responsible in case any problems arise when the facilities are launched. However, this type of contract was not available when Usiminas was constructed (K, July 10, 2002).
44 Takabayashi, Jiro. “Technology Transfer from a Variety of Points of View—Technology Transfer in Developing Countries from the Perspective of Technology Formation,” OIU Journal of International Studies, 6(3), 1993, p.66.
45 The Usiminas Memoirs Editing Group, pp.34–35. Kobayashi, pp.131–32.
46 The Usiminas Memoirs Editing Group, p.34.
47 Kobayashi, pp.142/145.
48 Kobayashi, pp.144–145.
49 The Usiminas Memoirs Editing Group, p.35.
50 Kobayashi, p.144.
51 Okamura, Yoshitaka. “Atsuita-kojo deno Akekure [Day and Night at the Heavy Plate Plant],” Ipatinga Jiho, No. 27, August 10, 1962, p.3. Nakagawa, Yasuzo. Usiminas Monogatari [The Story of Usiminas], The Sanno Institute of Management Junior College Publishing Division, 1974, pp.138–139.
52 Kobayashi, pp.140/142.
53 Since the topic of education and training of middle-rank and general employees is of significance, I shall discuss it in another paper.
54 Kobayashi, p.142.
55 K, November 26, 2001 and January 28, 2002.
56 K, June 24, 2003.
57 K, June 24, 2002.
58 Training for department manager class employees was also held based on this model (OJT according to man-months) (K, February 19, 2002).
59 The Usiminas Memoirs Editing Group, p.28.
60 The Usiminas Memoirs Editing Group, pp.35–36.
61 Nakamura, Naoto. “Koro Monogatari Yoroku; Brazil to Watashi [Excerpts from a Blast Furnace Story: Brazil and Me]” (2) Kinzoku [Metals & technology], 68(9), 1998, p.91. Nakamura, Naoto. “Koro Monogatari; Sekai wo Shiyani [A Blast Furnace Story: Taking a World View],” Kinzoku [Metals & Technology], 67(8), 1998, pp.82–83. In May 1965, approximately after one and a half years, a Brazilian was made the head of the Ironmaking Department (Japanese Study Team B1), which implied that the iron facility organization was now completely operated by Brazilians (Nakamura, “Koro Monogatari Yoroku; Brazil to Watashi” (5), p.91).
62 K, November 26, 2001, “Seitetsujo Sosiki no Kaisei [Reorganization of the Steelworks]” “Ri-chakunin sha [Left and Arrived]” Ipatinga Jiho, 10, November 1964, pp.9–11.
63 K, February 12, 2002.